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ABSTRACT 
The number of medical malpractice claims has been increasing in recent years. 
However, because of the sensitiveness of information and no malpractice insurance 
coverage, no objective claims-based data has been released in Taiwan to estimate 
malpractice risk and its economic burden. In a university hospital of Taiwan, after 
forming a working group for solving malpractice claims in the past 6 years (2005-20 1 0), 
we have collected 445 cases and examined the clinical, administrative, economic and 
legal information for these cases. First, after applying the Theory of Planned Behavior as 
our conceptual framework, we have performed several risk-adjustment models of 
associated factors on the odds of having legal action. Our main results are that the number 
of meetings between doctor and patient (OR= 2.478, p<O.OOO 1 ), along with other factors 
are significantly associated with the incidence of a malpractice claim developing into a 
legal action (c-statistics= 0.838). Second, using the amount of compensation as the 
outcome variable in all settled claims, we have constructed two-part models to describe 
the relationship between risk factors and outcome. The two-part models contain a logistic 
regression model as the first part to predict the frequency of paid claims (4.2 times more 
IV 
odds of having paid claims with every meeting between doctor and patient, OR= 4.235 , 
p<0.001; c-statistics= 0.918) and an ordinary linear regression model as the second part 
to predict the amounts of these payments (every meeting between doctors and patient 
increasing the payment at 0.18 million NTD [R-square= 0.5521]). Our third study 
estimates nationwide malpractice costs for Taiwan based on our database, given 
limitations of extrapolating from a single hospital. We find that the estimated annual cost 
of medical malpractice for all of Taiwan's doctors is NTD 239.6 million (7.99 million 
USD) with a range from NTD 168.6 million to 404.3 million (5.62 million to 13.4 million 
USD). Such a low estimate may be caused by low lawsuit costs (42.7 million NTD, 1.42 
million USD) and lower paid claims ratio for settled claims (21 %). The results of the 
legal-economic analysis will contribute to forming a rational basis for policy debate for 
current malpractice reform in Taiwan. 
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Chapter 1: Constructing a malpractice claim database and using a logistic 
regression model to predict legal action among malpractice claims in a Taiwan 
medical center 
Background 
The number of malpractice claims against physicians has been noted to be 
increasing in recent years worldwide and this is also the case in Taiwan. 1, 2, 9 Many 
physicians practicing today have to face higher malpractice risks than their predecessors. 
In Taiwan, numerous research studies have explored the influences of these medical 
malpractice claims on the patient and the whole society.3,4 On the other hand, fewer 
studies have investigated the impacts from the point of view of physicians. Some of these 
studies are just surveys of behaviors and attitudes of physicians who are involved in 
malpractice proceedings. 11 Furthermore, the emotional damage or stress to physicians 
caused by these malpractice claims is worsening. A recent study used the same instrument 
to survey the experience of medical malpractice by physicians in Taiwan in 1991 and 
2005.15 The results showed that "medical malpractice experiences were decreasing in 
prevalence, but increasing in severity". Partly because the sensitivity of information 
being revealed could jeopardize a hospital's reputation, and partly because essentially no 
malpractice insurance coverage is provided for health care providers, no objective 
claim-based data has been released in Taiwan to estimate medical malpractice risk, either 
from government statistics or insurance companies. One reasonable approach to solve the 
problem of the current lack of valid records for accurate malpractice risk estimation 
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should be to first build up a risk management process for managing these malpractice 
claims in each hospital across the country. Because, without wide-spread malpractice 
management activities, there are no better ways to record the detailed information of 
these malpractice claims, which is essential to build up a solid malpractice research 
database. It is only when every hospital has established its own database, that we are able 
to aggregate these sources of information to provide a better quality of data for academic 
research and policy-making decisions. 
This research uses a single-hospital malpractice claim database in Taiwan (National 
Taiwan University Hospital, NTUH). We intend to employ the Theory for Planned 
Behavior (TPB) as our conceptual framework to analyze these malpractice claims 
empirically. Our goal is to estimate a risk-adjustment model to explain the probability of 
legal action among all malpractice claims in this urban University Hospital from the 
perspective of physicians malpractice claim. We hypothesize that the risk of legal action 
can be predicted by our risk adjusted model and a set of variables, which enables us to 
demonstrate the intention and behavior of physician encountering a malpractice claim, 
which is different from previous studies adopting the viewpoints from other parties, such 
as patients or lawyers. The details of all our hypotheses are listed in the end of conceptual 
framework. 
Literature review: 
In the field of medical malpractice, many pioneers have paved the road leading to 
our study. Economic framework was one of the earlier conceptual models employed to 
explain the motivation of patient's filing a malpractice claim by expected award 
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exceeding the expected costs of claiming.2s A series of articles, published by Sloan et al. 
40, 43 since late 1980's, started to examine the relationship of the legal action and related 
determinants. Based on the data collected from families of adverse birth outcome and 
patients from emergency room in Florida, they have developed several risk adjusted 
models to describe the different characteristics of these claimants who filed lawsuit or 
settlement versus dropped cases in these patient groups. Additionally, they surveyed 
patients ' and families ' experiences of filing a claim and the detailed process of going 
through the resolution or litigation process, which revealed more precious information of 
patients' decision-making mechanism. Consequently, their study approach focuses more 
on the initiation and resolution of their claims from patients' perspective, which is 
different from our study approach from physician 's perspective to understand the risk of 
legal action in all malpractice claims. 
Around the same period of time, a group of researchers including epidemiologists, 
law scholars and physicians, mostly affiliated to Harvard University, started to explore 
the causes of medical errors and detailed mechanism of how these errors becoming 
malpractice claims. They published a series of studies 5,6,s, later called the Harvard 
Medical Malpractice Study, focusing on the untoward medical occurrence causing 
medical malpractice claim, so called "adverse event", which is more related to the 
preventability of medical incidents. Because the methodology of their studies requires 
independent reviews of thousands of medical charts, it is very time-consuming and 
expensive. But they have published many articles and several books since early 1990's 
and continued to bring in more articles to this field. 
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Another interesting article from Penchansky et al. , also published in 1990, adopted a 
similar approach to our study to understand patients' and their lawyers ' willingness to 
pursue a lawsuit with a different framework regarding "anger, reluctance to sue, patient 
and provider worthiness, affinity, economic burden and potential for compensation" using 
a set of the characteristics of patients, providers, injury and doctor-patient relationship to 
see if their risk of going to trials and settling for a certain amount of costs. Although they 
provided a valid conceptual model to follow, their study surveyed 113 medical 
malpractice plaintiff's attorney to obtain these information, which is indirect and less 
comparable. Their study approach concentrates more on patients' intent to file 
malpractice claims, which is also quite different from our approach to examine the 
reactions of physicians facing malpractice claims. 
Studies in this related field in Taiwan have been scarce. Wu et al. 15, 44 has published 
two studies in 2009. The first article, based on nationwide surveys to investigate 
physician 's experiences of malpractice claims in Taiwan, found that physicians of a 
certain age group ( 45-64 years old) and some specialties (Obstetrician/ gynecologist and 
surgeons) suffered significantly higher risk of medical malpractice. Their second article is 
a hospital-based case-control study (subject number: 147 cases versus 44,045 controls). 
After defining the outcome as resolution, compensation and lawsuit, the study showed 
that those compensated cases and lawsuits were more likely to be associated with 
admission via emergency room, surgical specialty and living in an urban area. 
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Conceptual Framework 
Medical malpractice claims involve different aspects of interaction between 
physicians and patients (including family). From the physician's perspective, since one's 
resident training and post-graduate practice years, one built up a certain type of behavior 
pattern and one possessed professional characteristics to cause higher or lower risk of 
being sued. On the other hand, from the patient's perspective, many factors work together 
to urge a claimant to raise a malpractice claim: from acknowledging what is medical 
injury to the reaction of their response. In order to tease out these underlying factors, 
what are intertwined in these cases, we have collected over 400 malpractice claims over a 
6-year period in our database. 
Since its appearance in the 1980's, behavioral psychologists have explored the 
theory of planned behavior (TPBht to predict human behavioral intention in different 
fields, such as education, advertising, and public relations. As researchers became more 
familiar with TPB, it became widely applied in health care studies of health-related 
behaviors such as lung cancer patients' decisions on whether or not to participate in a 
clinical triah3 or on which surgery choices for breast cancer patients22 . Recently, for 
health services research, TPB has attracted intense attention to the field of physician 
practice pattems24 • According to TPB, intentions (and behaviors) are a function of three 
sets of determinants : 1) attitude toward the behavior, specifically denoting the 
individual's (in our study, physician's) positive or negative evaluation of performing the 
particular behavior; 2) subjective norm, which is the person's (physician's) perception of 
social pressure to perform or not perform the behavior; and 3) the individual's 
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(physicians') perceived behavioral control, meaning the sense of ability to perform the 
behavior2 1. This theoretical framework has the potential to examine that the factors 
underlie the interplay between the physician 's intention and behavior of facing and 
reacting to malpractice claims. In applying TPB to explain the intention and behavior of 
how physicians manage to respond to malpractice claims, we will use these three 
domains, as listed above in past paragraph, to construct a theoretical model for better 
understanding these interactions. Aside from these perspectives from physician, a set of 
background factors such as patient's age, gender, socioeconomic (SES) status and initial 
disease status will be added to assist to analyze any further influence from patient's side. 
The fust domain of attitudes toward the behavior is the physician's evaluation of the 
consequences of having encountered a claim, which is further linked to that specific 
physician's evaluation of the process and outcome with this action. We will put clinical 
factors of the incident (severity of medical injury, functional status of clinical outcome 
after incident) and process factors of managing the incident (different pathways of having 
claims, different strategies for managing these claims including in depth discussion 
within care team, further communication between doctor and patient and more official 
letters for explanation) in this category, for these factors are the main considerations of 
physician 's evaluation. The second major determinant of this theory, subjective norm, is 
the social influences of peer group or institution on his reaction to the claim. These 
important "social referents" include friends, other medical professionals and, the most 
significant, institutional regulation. All physician's practice factors (such as department, 
subspecialty, and having more than one claim) as well as some patient safety factors 
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related to unexpected or unavoidable medical conditions (a group of factors assigned to 
each incident afterwards) should be taken into account in this category. The third group of 
major predictors, perceived behavioral control, is about the perception of the physician's 
adaptability to deal with a claim. These factors of resources and opportunity will either 
facilitate or limit the physician's actions. We will include the physician's personal 
characteristics (such as age, gender and training status) and location of incident (ward, 
outpatient clinics or emergency room) in this category. As for background factors, we will 
have patient's demographics (age, gender), residence (used as a proxy for SES status), 
time variables for this incident (year, quarter and month), patient's initial disease severity, 
self-paid procedure (medical procedures or devices not covered by National Health 
Insurance Program in Taiwan), and incident category from National Practitioner Data 
Bank (NPDB)20 as the fourth set of predictors in this model. Figure 1-1 is a summarized 
graphic representation of TPB as applied in this study. 
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Figure 1-1 The theory of planned behavior applied in malpractice claim study 
This framework, combined with some features of physicians and institutional 
management process, leads to several testable hypotheses: 
Hl.l: We hypothesize that factors from the risk management process have 
influences on decision making by physicians to have legal actions. 
H1.1.1: One pathway of reporting a claim, frontline direct report is hypothesized 
to be more likely to have a legal action. 
H1.1.2: We also hypothesize that the number of meetings between doctor and 
patient is highly associated with the probability of having legal action against the 
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physician. 
H1.2: In the second domain of subjective norm, because there are various risks of 
practice environment and different leadership in each specialty, we hypothesize that 
physicians from certain departments have higher risks of having legal action than other 
departments. 
H1.3: The characteristics of physicians (the third part of framework- perceived 
behavior control) are hypothesized to be highly associated with the nsk of legal action. 
H1.3 .1: We hypothesize that as physicians get older, they are more likely to have 
legal action. 
H1.3.2: We also hypothesize that resident involved in the claim will increase the 
risk of legal action. 
H1.4: In the fourth domain- background factors, we hypothesize that patient's 
demographics are associated with the risk of legal action. 
H1.4.1: If patient's age gets older, it is hypothesized to be associated with higher risk 
of legal action. 
Table 1-I will classify all the factors collected in our database relative to each 
category of TPB. This table intends to reveal the correlation of these variables in their 
original grouping and the domains ofTPB. 
9 
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Table 1-I All explanatory factors classified into four domains of conceptual framework 
Domains Attitude toward behavior Subjective norm Perceived behavior control 
Patient's 
demographics 
Clinical factors Severity of medical injury, 
Patient's clinical outcome 
after incident 
Process factors Source of report, Number of 
meetings within care team, 
Number of meetings 
between doctor and patients, 
Number of official mails 
Characteristics 
of physicians 
Incident 
factors 
Patient Safety Communication- axis 
Classification 
Department, 
More than one 
claims 
Location of incident 
Age of physician, Gender 
of physicians, 
Post-graduate status, 
Unexpected or Compliance-axis 
unavoidable- axis 
Background factors 
Age of patients, Gender of 
patients, Patient's residence 
Patient's prior condition 
before incident 
NPDB categories, Self-paid 
medical procedures 
Environment- axis 
*This table was specified by authors. 
Methods 
Risk management process for malpractice claims: 
In National Taiwan University Hospital (NTUH), under the visionary leadership of 
previous Superintendent Professor Fang-Yu Lin, we started the risk management process 
for malpractice claims by establishing a unique risk management unit and negotiating 
representative about a decade ago. Because of the complicated nature of these claims, it 
really matters to have a strong group of people and strong leadership for managing 
malpractice claims. Generally, a Vice-Superintendent was assigned an executive role to 
recruit all the members of the working group and to oversee all the activities of them. He 
chaired the routine weekly meeting for the reports of unresolved claims and provided his 
opinion to direct the resolution of these claims. Currently, this multi-disciplinary, 
centralized working group comprises several experienced social workers, consulting 
doctors, and public relations personnel. This group has worked out more than 400 cases 
and accumulated essential information on both the clinical and legal processes and 
outcomes of these malpractice claims. 
The usual pathway of initiating this risk management process is when a patient (or 
family) claims to have a medical injury or a health care provider finds a medical injury 
caused by medical procedure or associated behavior during a patient's stay in our hospital 
(whether in emergency room, outpatient clinic visit or admission). A social worker will 
take the notice from the provider or complaint from the patient, which is either directly 
sent to the group or referred by other offices within the hospital or some administrative 
personnel in the hospital such as Superintendent or Vice-Superintendent. Then the social 
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worker will act as the neutral third party to support them in the whole process of 
malpractice claim and will record the request from the patient and family. After the 
patient's medical injury is documented, the working group will discuss the cause of the 
medical injury and possible ways of dealing with this incident. If the working group finds 
no medical injury after analyzing the whole claim, and one of our medical consultants 
confirms this fmding, then the group will explain the finding to the patient and family by 
filing an official explanatory letter or conducting a meeting between the medical care 
team and the patient side. If the patient side accepts the explanation, the claim is closed. 
If the patient side rejects the explanation, they will appeal to the working group again for 
more communication processes or seek other pathways such as an out-of-hospital legal 
action (a lawyer 's legal notice or a prosecutor's litigation investigation). 
If this working group finds that medical injury exists and decides this incident 
should probably have monetary compensation (either through settlement or lawsuit), then 
the whole case will be submitted to a higher committee. As an expert-panel, the 
committee is composed of a variety of prestigious specialists in the hospital (generally, 
this group of physicians is nominated by the Superintendent of the hospital at the 
beginning of his term) to make a final decision on whether there is a medical error or not 
and whether to settle the case by providing a certain amount of money or to face a lawsuit 
filed against the health care providers and/or the hospital. Legal opinion will be presented 
in the meeting when needed. These experts are all clinicians in our hospital, and usually 
two of them in related fields will be assigned the same claim for a preliminary analysis 
reported to the committee. After open discussion among all members, they will vote on 
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whether economic compensation is warranted. If the committee votes for economic 
compensation, then the second vote will decide on the monetary amount and the 
proportion of payment between these providers and the hospital. If the committee votes to 
contest a lawsuit and all providers involved agree, then they will assign the working 
group the responsibility for hiring a lawyer to work with these health care providers. If 
the committee votes to settle the claim, the working group will, after obtaining agreement 
from all involved health care providers, negotiate with the patient and family for a certain 
amount of compensation that has been previously granted by the higher committee. The 
working group will execute the final decision of this expert-panel to negotiate with the 
patient and family and follow up the future development of each case. Once they reach an 
agreement on the compensation or the final results of the lawsuit come out, this working 
group will close the claim. 
Figure 1-2 is a diagram describing the complicated interaction between physicians 
and the patient (family) when the medical incident happens and how our risk 
management working group deal with this claim. We have specified the five possible 
pathways to initiate a malpractice claim in our hospital, starting from the upper left comer, 
and also four possible litigation outcomes in the bottom box of "claims closed". Each 
number contained in the small circle tied to the last four arrows denotes the case number 
in each possible litigation outcome. 
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Figure 1-2 Dynamics of a medical incident during claim management (The number 
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contained in the small circle near the box of "claim closed" denotes the case number in a 
specific type of litigation outcomes, which is compatible to the summarized table of our 
outcome variable in Table 1-IV) 
To establish a malpractice database: 
Since we have constructed a concrete process for solving these claims, we start 
to collect the information associated with these malpractice claims effectively. The nature 
of our database is a claim-based source combined with data from specified medical charts 
merged by patient's identification and chart number. We extract most of the clinical 
information such as patient's demographics, clinical outcome, or physician's specialty 
from the medical charts. The second part of the data can be drawn from the working 
journal of the group member and the records of the regular meetings of the group. This 
information consists mostly of the process or the outcome of handling these claims such 
as different pathways to file a claim or various meetings among the providers and the 
patient. This type of data is generally more difficult to collect because we need to actively 
gather it. Once we have collected both parts of information, then we can say we have 
established a relatively complete database for malpractice claims. 
Data collecting process: 
From January 1, 2005 to December 31 , 2010, we collected 455 malpractice 
claims (based on their claim date) in a tertiary care center and university teaching hospital 
in Taiwan. We excluded 8 non-medical claims, which were filed against other hospital 
personnel or affiliated workers (such as janitor for lost dentures, water dripping from the 
roof of ward, poor performance of nursing aid hired from outside company, etc.) instead 
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of physicians. Additionally, there were four claimants who filed two claims in these six 
years. The first two claimants, both of them individually filed two separate claims against 
the same physician for exactly the same clinical incident; therefore, we combined these 
four claims into two cases, respectively. The third patient filed two separable claims 
regarding the same procedure: the first claim involved the discomfort of the procedure 
and the second involved the cost of the procedure's follow-up pharmaceutical treatment; 
therefore, we treated them as two separate cases. The last claimant filed two claims 
against two different physicians for two sites of operation (left and right ear) in two years 
(2009, 2010), which was counted as two cases. In conclusion, the total number of claims 
in this analysis was 445. The data collecting process of the malpractice database is 
showed in Figure 1-3. 
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Figure 1-3 Data collecting process for malpractice claims in NTUH 
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Database structure and variable explanation: 
Outcome variable: 
We adopt a binary variable of legal action (Yes/No) as our outcome variable for the 
logistic regression analysis. This variable describes the frequency of the patient's further 
determinative action in the legal process (such as seeking payment for settlement or filing 
a lawsuit) against physician versus those who had no further legal actions (including 
patients accept explanation and patients reject explanation but do not take further action) 
afterwards. The detail of outcome variable is summarized in Table 1-IV. 
Explanatory variables: 
Demographics of patient: Patient's demographical factors consisted of age, gender, 
chart number, and claim date. Patient's residence, extracted from medical chart, is 
recorded as ZIP code and used as a proxy for socio-economic status (SES), classified by 
their urban residential land price37 to be six levels (high income area in Taipei city, low 
income area in Taipei city, high income area in New Taipei city, low income area in new 
Taipei city, Suburban <Taoyuan-Hsinchu> area and non-urban rural area). 
Clinical factors : this group of factors contain diagnosis, location of the incident-
divided into three different categories <inpatient ward, outpatient clinic (OPD) and 
emergency room (ER)>, initial disease severity- six levels <defined by Glasgow Outcome 
Scale, beginning with 1 as no disability, 2 to 4 as mild to severe disability, 5 as vegetative 
and ending with 6 as death>, severity of medical injury- 4 levels <ranged from 1 for no 
injury or emotional injury, 2 for temporary injury, 3 for permanent injury to 4 for major 
or life-threatening injury> and final clinical outcome-six levels <the same as initial 
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disease severity>. Except location of the incident, the remaining clinical conditions are 
subjectively assessed by a member of our working group and a consulting doctor; 
therefore, these ordinal variables contain a certain degree of bias as compared to other 
objectively recorded clinical information. 
Process factors: process factors are listed as below: source of report- five pathways 
to initiate the claim including: frontline report by doctor or nurse at the scene of medical 
incident, direct visit to our working group office by the clamant, malpractice claims 
handed over from higher hospital officials, compliant referred by other office within 
hospital, and out of hospital notice from lawyer or court; the number of meetings for 
discussion within medical care team, or meeting between doctors and patient and the 
number of official letters for explanation. These variables are extracted from our working 
journal and meeting records. 
Characteristics of Physicians: we include physician's age (from 26 to 61, broken in 
1 0-year-intervals at 35, 45 and 55), gender, post-graduate status (as resident versus 
attending), and repeated claims 14 (defined as more than one claims in these six years). We 
also include dummy variables for involved department and involved personnel (coded for 
attending staff, resident, nurse and others). 
Incident factors: medical incidents giving rise to claims are classified by the ten 
categories of US Federal National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB)t 7, t8,19,20 negligence 
coding: anesthesia, diagnosis, equipment/product, intravenous/blood, medications, 
obstetrics, patient monitoring, surgery, treatment, or miscellaneous. Since there have been 
reports of more frequent malpractice claims for self-paid medical procedures 14, we are 
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wondering if a medical procedure involving out of pocket self-payment will increase the 
chance of filing a legal action. Therefore, we include one variable coded for if 
malpractices claim involving self-payment. These clinical, process, physician 
characteristics and incident factors were listed along with our format of conceptual 
framework in Table 1-II. 
Table 1-II Description of independent variables in database 
Variable Characteristic Division/Level 
Outcome Legal action Binary 2 
Attitude Severity of medical injury Ordinal 4 
toward Patient's clinical outcome Ordinal 6 
behavior after incident 
Source of report Categorical 5 
Number of discussion Continuous 0~5 
meetings within medical 
care team 
Number of communication Continuous 0~6 
meetings between doctor 
and patient 
Number of official mails Continuous 0~4 
Patient safety Dummy 2 (Communication) 
classifications 
Subjective Department Dummy 28 
norm Patient safety Dummy 3 (Unexpected or unavoidable) 
classifications 
More than one claim Binary 2 
Perceived Post-graduate status Dummy 2 
behavior (Resident versus Staff) 
control 
Age group of physicians Categorical 4(<35 , 35~45 , 45~55, >55) 
Gender of physicians Binary 2 (Male, female) 
Location of incident Categorical 3 (ward, OPD, ER) 
Patient safety Dummy 5 (Compliance) 
classifications 
Background Age group of patient Categorical 3 (<18, 18~50, >50) 
factors Gender of patients Binary 2 (Male, female) 
Patient's residence Categorical Zip code 
Initial disease severity Ordinal 6 
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NPDB category 
Self-paid procedure 
Patient safety 
classifications 
Categorical 
Binary 
Dummy 
10 
2 
5 (Environment) 
Patient Safety Classification (P-SAC): This is another group of dummy variables 
consisting of a set of 16 patient safety classifications, which could be attributed to these 
incidents to denote their nature of malpractice such as diagnosis problem (P-SAC16), 
communication within care team (P-SAC15) ... etc. They are similar to the patient safety 
indicators (PSI) from Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), but more in 
a way of flagging these incidents qualitatively. In order to understand the interaction 
between these classified patient safety categories, we could further group them into four 
axes: 
Communication axis- The reason why we classify these two categories 
(communication between doctor and patient or within care team) to attitude toward the 
behavior is because both are associated with communication problems, which is mostly 
related to physician's attitude of how to discuss with his coworkers or patients. The first 
patient safety category (P-SACll) shows lack of communication between doctor and 
patient. A representative example can be a physician did not mention the risk of 
developing a infection before surgery or an invasive procedure. When a post-operative 
infection did happen, patient claimed that he suffered from a medical injury. The second 
one (P-SAC 15) highlights a poor communication within a care team, mostly due to 
complicated process of consultation between different specialties or hand-over problems 
between residents and attending physicians. 
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Unexpected outcomes or unavoidable conditions axis- Most of these categories are 
related to medical incidents with unexpected changes of patient's condition (P-SAC5), 
patient's emotional dissatisfactions with medical care (P-SAC6), or unavoidable medical 
complications during or after the clinical procedure or surgery (P-SAC13). Accordingly, 
these patient safety categories are put in the domain of subjective norm. Because of the 
suffering treatment process or the lower-than- expectation clinical results, emotionally 
dissatisfied patients or families tend to believe physicians violating the norms or ethics of 
a doctor-patient relationship and blame the physicians despite no true medical errors 
involved. One of such examples is that a terminal colon cancer patient presented in ER 
with septic shock due to tumor rupture and general peritonitis, at the age of 80, fails to 
survive the colon resection procedure, which is mostly acceptable considering his old age, 
high risk of surgery and end-staged cancer status. But his siblings go to file a charge at 
court mainly because they expect all surgical procedures should save their parent's life, 
not cause him to death. For an unreasonably high expectation like this case, we will code 
it as emotionally dissatisfied claimants in P-SAC6. Another example in this axis is a 
patient underwent a spinal surgery smoothly but appeared to have a late rectal bleeding 
on the 1Oth post-operative day, just before his discharge. After a definite colofibroscopic 
examination, he was diagnosed to have colon cancer. Then patient claimed to have 
delayed diagnosis of cancer. Such case is classified as unavoidable complications after 
surgery, which is coded as P-SAC13. 
Compliance axis- these patient safety categories are put in the third domain of our 
theory: perceived behavior control because they are all related to following the 
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regulations of the hospital or physician 's professional resources in managmg these 
incidents. The first three categories, P-SAC2, 3 and 4 are talking of clinical staff not 
following SOP or clinical guidelines. About the last three categories, P-SAC8 denotes 
that the involved physician simply does not focus on his clinical practice. P-SAClO 
indicates that there are problems for physician in supervising his residents or nurses for 
clinical practice. A typical example is medical incidents caused by a clinical practice such 
as surgery or endoscopy performed by residents, who failed to notify his supervising 
attending staff. P-SAC12 factor is related to patient's private medical information not 
being well kept, as a form of violating patient's privacy, which is also an important 
compliance issue of SOP. 
Environment axis- these categories are connected to a poor or unsafe condition 
preexisted in the hospital (P-SACl , 7, and 9) or a specific clinical situation such as 
clinical trial (P-SAC14) or some limitation causing diagnosis problems (P-SAC16), 
which were certainly linked to a background territory in our theoretical framework. 
P-SAC7 generally pertains to patient safety issues such as patient falls , while P-SAC 9 is 
more likely associated with a clinical circumstance, for instance, an angiographic guide 
wire broken with the tip flowing downstream to the brain to result in a stroke. 
These classifications are assigned by a group of patient safety consultants in our 
hospital center for quality of care and such patient safety activity has continued for more 
than a decade. It is a quality control/surveillance activity throughout the whole hospital, 
not restricted to malpractice management process only. All the categories related to 
patient safety were listed in the Table 1-III. 
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Table I-III Patient safety classifications grouped by four axes 
Domain l Factor Description 
Communication axis (Attitude toward behavior) 
P-SAC 11 Insufficient communication between doctor and patient 
P-SAC15 Insufficient internal communication within care team 
Unexpected or unavoidable axis (Subjective norm) 
P-SAC 5 Unexpected change of patient condition 
P-SAC 6 Emotional dissatisfaction 
P-SAC13 Complications of medical procedure or operation 
Compliance axis (Perceived behavior control) 
P-SAC 2 Not following Standard of Procedure (SOP) 
P-SAC 3 Not following clinical guideline 
P-SAC 4 Understand the rules but not following them 
P-SAC 8 Inattention to medical practice 
P-SAClO Dysfunctional monitoring 
P-SAC12 Violation of patient's privacy 
Environment axis (Background factors) 
P-SAC 1 No rule nor Standard of Procedure (SOP) 
P-SAC7 Unsafe environment without improvement 
P-SAC9 Uncontrollable environment 
P-SAC14 Clinical trial 
P-SAC 16 Diagnosis problem 
Initially, intending to mirror what we are thinking conceptually, confirmatory factor 
analysis with Promax rotation (more related to the real world, where Varimax is more 
strictly orthogonal) yields four factors . Despite a certain degree of differences, there are 
three discreet factors (communication, unexpected or unavoidable and compliance) 
revealed clearly, but the fourth factor (Environment axis) is weaker and not revealed well. 
Perhaps, it is because the variables of first three factors are more homogeneous while 
those of the fourth tend to be more heterogeneous and the item content very diverse and 
less meaningful. 
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Statistical analysis: After fmishing the descriptive statistics with bar charts of 
outcome variable and tables of central tendency and proportions for univariate analysis, 
we perform a bivariate analysis including Student-t-test for continuous variables and 
Chi-square test for categorical variables to examine the association between the outcome 
variable (legal action- yes or no) and all other independent variables. Finally, we will 
apply logistic regression models to construct a series of risk-adjusted models from our 
conceptual framework (criteria for selection of variables: p < 0.25) with all the 
misspecification tests using SAS program. 
Results 
Following the report of the descriptive statistics of our outcome and explanatory 
variables, the main results of our study are to estimate a risk-adjusted logistic regression 
model, which denotes the number of communication meetings between doctor and patient, 
along with other factors to be significantly associated with the risk of a malpractice claim 
developing into a legal action in this hospital- NTUH. 
Descriptive statistics: 
We plot all claims according to their occurrence by year, quarter, and month in 
Figure 1-4, 1-5, and 1-6. Basically, we cannot observe any obvious difference or trend in 
the frequency of malpractice claims between each year and quarter noted from directly 
examining these bar charts. But if we take out the first year (2005) as an outlier, then 
there seems to be a continuous increase in the number of events along the timeline, 
except in 2009 when the number reached a peak of 88 claims. According to the results of 
their litigation processes, we classify our malpractice claims into four categories: patient 
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accepting explanation, patient rejecting explanation, settlement and lawsuit. We combine 
the fust two categories into no legal action while the last two categories into those 
pursuing a legal action. The summary of outcome variable is also displayed in Table 1-IV. 
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Figure 1-4 Frequency of events by year 
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Figure 1-5 Frequency of events by quarters and years 
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Figure 1-6 Frequency of events by month 
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Table 1-N Summary of outcome variable (Legal action) 
Legal action No. of Claims Litigation outcome No. ofClaims 
Yes 136 Lawsuit 42 
Settlement (Paid claims) 94 
No 309 Patient rejects explanation 199 
Patient accepts explanation 110 
Univariate analysis: Our database includes five continuous variables (Table 1-V) and 
more than forty categorical variables (Table 1-VI). Because the Department code variable 
contains the more than twenty clinical departments in our hospital, we only present those 
that are significantly related to the outcome variable here. 
Continuous variables 
Table 1-V Means and variance for continuous variables 
Variables N Mean Variance Standard Minimum Maximum 
Deviation 
Age of patients 445 51.282 516.363 22.724 0.063 96 
Age of doctors 445 44.798 98.144 9.907 24 82 
Number of 445 0.721 0.593 0.770 0 5 
meetings within 
care team 
Number of 445 0.474 0.592 0.770 0 6 
meetings 
between doctors 
and patient 
Number of 445 0.571 0.493 0.702 0 4 
official letters 
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Categorical variables 
Table 1-VI Description of independent variables in database 
Domain Variable Level Frequency Percent Cumulative Cumulative 
Freguenc~ Percent 
Attitude Severity of medical injury No inj ury 161 36.18 161 36.18 
toward Mild injury 122 27.42 283 63 .60 
behavior Moderate injury 42 9.44 325 73 .03 
Major or life-threatening injury 120 26.97 445 100.00 
Patient's clinical outcome Normal 163 36.63 163 36.63 
after incident Temporary or mild disability 69 15.51 232 52.13 
N Moderate or Permanent disability 18 4.04 250 56.18 
\0 Severel:l disability 17 3.82 267 60.00 
Vegetative 31 6.97 298 66.97 
Dead 147 33.03 445 100.00 
Source of reporting a claim Direct reEort through office 55 12.36 55 12.36 
Frontline report by Eroviders 129 28.99 184 41.35 
Internal referral b:l other offices 178 40.00 362 81.35 
Out of hosEital filing a notice 48 10.79 410 92.13 
Referral from toE level of administration 35 7.87 445 100.00 
Patient safety classifications P-SAC11 109 24.49 109 24.49 
P-SAC15 14 3.15 14 3.15 
Subjective Department Surgery 112 25 .17 112 25.17 
norm Internal medicine 91 20.45 91 20.45 
Obstetrics and G~necology 23 5.17 23 5.17 
Urology 20 4.49 20 4.49 
Otolaryngology 18 4.04 18 4.04 
Radiology 15 3.37 15 3.37 
Oncologi: 12 2.70 12 2.70 
Anesthesiologi: 11 2.47 11 2.47 
Genetic medicine 1 0.22 1 0.22 
Health Examination Center 1 0.22 1 0.22 
Patient safety classifications P-SAC5 74 16.63 74 16.63 
P-SAC6 143 32.13 143 32.13 
P-SAC13 76 17.08 76 17.08 
More than one claim No 128 28.76 128 28.76 
Yes 31 7 71.24 445 100.00 
Perceived Post-graduate status Attending Phi:sician 445 100.00 445 100.00 
behavior Resident 93 20.90 93 20.90 
control Nurse 31 6.97 31 6.97 
Others 16 3.60 16 3.60 
Age group of physicians <35 62 13.93 62 13 .93 
VJ 35~45 179 40.22 241 54.16 0 
45~55 11 8 26.52 359 80.67 
>55 86 19.33 445 100.00 
Gender of physicians Female 59 13.26 59 13.26 
Male 386 86.74 445 100.00 
Location of incident lnEatient ward 261 58.65 261 58.65 
Outpatient clinic 109 24.49 370 83 .15 
Emergency room 75 16.85 445 100.00 
Patient safety classifications P-SAC2 24 5.39 24 5.39 
P-SAC3 9 2.02 9 2.02 
P-SAC4 4 0.90 4 0.90 
P-SAC8 30 6.74 30 6.74 
P-SAC10 8 1.80 8 1.80 
P-SAC12 2 0.45 2 0.45 
Back- Age group of patient <18 44 9.89 44 9.89 
ground 18~50 159 35.73 203 45.62 
factors >50 242 54.38 445 100.00 
Gender of patients Female 225 50.56 225 50.56 
Male 220 49.44 445 100.00 
Patient's residence Zip code (Refer to Table VII) 
Patient's prior condition Normal 164 36.85 164 36.85 
before incident Mildly ill 112 25.17 276 62.02 
Moderately ill 82 18.43 358 80.45 
Severely ill 81 18.20 439 98.65 
Vegetative 4 0.90 443 99.55 
Dead 2 0.45 445 100.00 
NPDB category Anesthesiology 10 2.25 10 2.25 
Drug 20 4.49 30 6.74 
Diagnosis 61 13.71 91 20.45 
Intravenous theraEY 13 2.92 104 23 .37 
Miscellaneous 38 8.54 142 31.91 
\.;.) Monitor 32 7.19 174 39.10 
....... Obstetrics 5 1.12 179 40.22 
0Eeration 139 31.24 318 71.46 
Treatment 119 26.74 437 98.20 
EguiEment 8 1.80 445 100.00 
Self-paid procedure No 360 80.90 360 80.90 
Yes 85 19.10 445 100.00 
Patient safety classifications P-SAC1 6 1.35 6 1.35 
P-SAC7 5 1.12 5 1.12 
P-SAC9 10 2.25 10 2.25 
P-SAC14 5 1.12 5 1.12 
P-SAC16 16 3.60 16 3.60 
Bi-variate analysis: 
To address the small sample size of our data, we further collapse several categorical 
variables to keep them at two or three divisions when we are fitting the logistic regression 
model (Table 1-VII). Location of incident is collapsed to be a binary variable indicating 
whether the incident happened after patient being admitted to an inpatient ward or the 
incident happened during patient's visiting emergency room or outpatient clinic. For 
source of reporting a claim, to report an incident by frontline physicians or nurses and to 
file a legal notice without going through our hospital mediating process are thought to be 
of higher risk than other pathways. The original ten incident categories used in National 
Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) to classifY malpractice claims are collapsed into only two 
levels: the first one aggregates all the incidents involved surgical or medical intervention 
including anesthesiology procedures, operation, equipment failure, medication errors, 
intravenous manipulation or administration, and other treatment modalities. The second 
category is classified as non-interventional clinical activities. The last variable is an 
income proxy variable, which is further collapsed into three levels of high mcome, 
middle income, and low-income living area from the original six levels. 
Chi-sguare test for time variables (year, quarter, and month): 
Despite no significant trend observed between the frequency of claims and the time 
variable, there is a significant change of litigation outcome (outcome variable classified 
by four levels) by year, demonstrated by the chi-square test for trend (p-value < 0.001). 
But if we further collapse our outcome variable into a binary variable of legal action, then 
there exists a trend for testing increasing legal actions by year (p-value=0.0792). 
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Table 1-VII Collapsed categorical variables (used for regression models) 
Collapsed Level Frequency Percentage Cumulative Cumulative 
Variable Frequency Percentage 
Location of Inpatient 261 58.65 261 58.65 
incident Outpatient 184 41.35 445 100 
(Emergency room 
and Outpatient clinic) 
Source of Direct report to 268 60.22 268 60.22 
reporting a office, internal 
claim referral and referral 
by a top executive 
official 
Frontline report and 177 39.78 445 100.00 
outside filing notice 
NPDB Interventional 309 69.44 309 69.44 
categories Non-interventional 136 30.56 445 100.00 
Zip code into High income 145 32.58 145 32.58 
three regions Middle income 167 37.53 312 70.11 
Low income 133 29.89 445 100.00 
Chi-square test for clinical factors: We have performed Chi-square test for legal 
actions by clinical factors (medical injury and clinical outcome). There are significant 
associations between both clinical factors and legal actions (p<O.OOO 1 ). Location of 
incident occurrence, after being collapsed into a binary variable of inpatient versus 
outpatient (combining cases of incident in ER and OPD), is another significant clinical 
factor associated with our legal action outcome (p=0.0029). From the results of our 
Chi-square analysis, resident involvement increases the risk of legal action. Our study 
shows a significant association oflegal action with resident involvement (p=0.003). 
Chi-square test for incident factors: Initially designed to break down the complexity 
of malpractice claims in US, NPDB classification has ten categories to differentiate the 
characteristics of the medical incidents. When applied in our database, some of the cells 
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will have small amount of events (between 5~ 1 0) after dividing into two legal action 
outcomes. To fit in the regression model better, we further collapsed these categories into 
two simplified levels: interventional or non-interventional. No matter which categories, 
the original ten or the simplified two, we choose to use, both of them are significantly 
related to the risk oflegal action (P<O.OOOl). 
Chi-sguare test for patient safety classifications: In this group of variables, only 
P-SAC6 (Patient feels emotionally dissatisfied with medical service), P-SAC13 (Patient 
encounters unavoidable complications from medical procedure or operation), P-SAC3 
(Physicians are not following the clinical guideline), and P-SAC8 (Physicians are not 
attentive to their medical practice) are significantly related to our outcome variables. 
Because these patient safety classifications are not designed only for managing 
malpractice claims, most of the categories show very low frequency (only six categories 
reach more than five percent of claims). 
Chi-sguare and Student-t test for process factors : For all process factors, the way of 
reporting a malpractice claim is demonstrated to be significantly associated with legal 
action by Chi-square test (p<O.OOOl), whether in five original groups or in three collapsed 
groups. For the number of meetings and official letters, they are all significantly 
associated with legal action by Student-t-test (showed in Table 1-IX). It is intuitive to 
understand that more meetings or letters will be required when the claim is more 
complicated or difficult to handle. 
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Table I-VIII Bi-variable analysis of outcome variable and associated factors with 
significant Chi-square test results 
Domain Variable Specified Number DF Value P-value 
Attitude Severity of medical 4 groups 445 3 24.6521 <.0001 
toward Ill JUry 
behavior Patient's clinical 6 groups 445 5 28.4865 <.0001 
outcome after incident 
Source of reporting a 5 groups 445 4 28.5114 <.0001 
claim 2 groups 445 1 23.1931 <.0001 
Patient safety P-SACll 445 1 2.2814 0.1309 
classifications 
Subjective Department Obstetrics and 445 1 3.4064 0.0649 
norm Gynecology 
Urology 445 1 2.3897 0.1221 
Oncology 445 1 1.1220 0.2895 
Radiology 445 1 3.7931 0.0515 
Patient safety P-SAC5 445 1 2.2143 0.1367 
classifications P-SAC6 445 1 27.2810 <.0001 
P-SAC13 445 1 7.1417 0.0075 
Perceived Post-graduate status Resident 445 1 8.5860 0.0034 
behavior involved 
control Inpatient incident Binary 445 1 8.8463 0.0029 
Patient safety P-SAC3 445 1 9.6498 0.0019 
classifications P-SAC4 445 1 3.7559 0.0526 
P-SAC8 445 1 16.2798 <.0001 
Background Patient's prior 6 groups 445 5 9.9082 0.0779 
factors condition before 
incident 
NPDB category 10 groups 445 9 30.5240 0.0004 
2 groups 445 1 15.3934 <.0001 
Patient safety factors Type 7 445 1 2.0650 0.1507 
Type9 445 1 1.8214 0.1771 
Socio-Economic Status 6 groups 445 5 6.8316 0.2335 
Proxy for income 3 groups 445 2 8.3951 0.0150 
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Table 1-IX Student-t-test for process factors by outcome 
Variables Legal N Mean Standard Standard t-value p-value 
Action Deviation Error 
Number of 0 309 0.586 0.696 0.040 -5.38 <0.0001 
meetings 1 136 1.029 0.843 0.072 
within care 
team 
Number of 0 309 0.301 0.550 0.031 -6.12 <0.0001 
meetings 1 136 0.868 1.017 0.087 
between 
doctors and 
patient 
Number of 0 309 0.625 0.726 0.041 2.45 0.0147 
official letters 1 136 0.449 0.630 0.054 
Predicting legal action using logistic regression model: our logistic regression model 
includes all significant variables from conceptual framework step by step (set p<0.25). 
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Table 1-X Logistic regression model for all claims (selection criteria: p<0.25) 
Variable Odds Ratio 95% Wald Pr > Chisq 
Point Estimate Confidence Limits 
of Odds Ratio 
Intercept -2.0574 <0.0001 
Attitude Source of Report: 2.229 1.336 3.721 0.0022* 
toward Frontline report and Out-of 
behavior hospital Filing 
Number of meetings for 1.476 1.021 2.132 0.0384* 
discussion within care 
team 
Number of communication 2.478 1.672 3.672 <.0001 * 
meetings between doctor 
and patient 
Number of Official Mails 0.744 0.509 1.089 0.1283 
Subjective P-SAC6 Emotional 0.520 0.273 0.990 0.0466* 
norm Dissatisfactory ion 
Medicine 0.470 0.239 0.925 0.0287* 
Urology 0.153 0.027 0.855 0.0325* 
Oncolog}:: 0.285 0.048 1.706 0.1692 
Perceived Ward 1.701 0.966 2.997 0.0658 
behavior Resident involved 1.801 0.989 3.279 0.0544 
control P-SAC3 Not following 9.731 1.258 75.265 0.0293* 
clinical guideline 
P-SAC8 Inattention to 2.662 1.028 6.892 0.0437* 
medical practice 
Age group of doctors 1.659 0.920 2.994 0.0926 
(45~55) 
Background Quarter Ill 0.516 0.284 0.938 0.0299* 
factors Age group of patients 0.375 0.150 0.936 0.0356* 
(0~18) 
Patient's prior condition 0.740 0.587 0.934 0.0112* 
before incident 
NPDB-Operation, 2.276 1.237 4.188 0.0082* 
Anesthesia, Equipment, 
Drug, IV and Treatment 
Middle income 1.792 1.074 2.989 0.0255* 
c-statistics: 0.838 
*: p<0.05 
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According to our conceptual framework, attitude toward behavior is our first domain 
and all process factors including the source of report and numbers of meetings, either 
within medical care team (Odds Ratio, OR= 1.476, p=0.0384) or between doctors and 
patient (OR= 2.478, p<O.OOOl), turn out to be significant in our combined logistic 
regression model. For those claims reported by frontline physicians and nurses or filed by 
patients without going through hospital's risk management process, they have a higher 
chance of causing legal action (OR= 2.229, p=0.0022). The comparison group is those 
claims referred by other internal offices, direct report to the working group and referred 
by senior executive officials. These factors reflect the detailed processes of decision 
making of the physician; therefore, they are highly correlated with the risk of legal action. 
For the second part of our framework, subjective norm, we can find the department 
of oncology is the only department showing significance in the regression model. 
Department of Internal Medicine (OR= 0.470, p=0.0287) and Urology (OR= 0.153, 
p=0.0325) have a lower odds ratio estimate which means they may act as a risk-lessening 
factor with less risk of legal action. Patient safety classifications P-SAC6 depicts that 
patient is not satisfied with his medical care emotionally, which stands here also as a 
significant risk-lessening factor (OR= 0.520, p=0.0466) for patient's legal action. 
The third domain of our framework is perceived behavior control, which contains 
several significant variables in our regression model: inpatient incident (OR= 1.701 , 
p=0.0658), resident involvement (OR= 2.600, p=0.0544), patient safety classifications 
P-SAC3 (not following clinical guideline, OR= 9.731 , p=0.0293) and P-SAC8 
(inattention to medical practice, OR= 2.662, p=0.0437), and the third age group (45~55 
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years old) ofphysicians (OR=1.659, p=0.0926). All five variables are both significantly 
related to increasing the risk of legal action, while inpatient incident, resident 
involvement and the third age group of doctors only gain borderline significance. 
The last part of this conceptual framework represents background factors. In our 
logistic regression model, there are several significant variables including the first age 
group of patients, the third quarter, patient's prior condition before incident, NPDB 
category related to intervention, and patient's residence used for SES proxy as in middle 
income area. The first three significant variables are all risk-lessening factors, which tell 
us that patients younger than 18 years old (OR= 0.375, p=0.0356), incident in the third 
quarter (OR= 0.516, p=0.0299) and patients with more serious clinical condition such as 
death or vegetation (OR= 0.740, p=O.Ol12) will have lower risk of legal action. As 
compared to the other group (combining diagnosis, monitoring, miscellaneous and 
obstetrical groups in original NPDB category), the intervention associated NPDB 
category (combing operation, anesthesia, equipment, drug, intravenous intervention, and 
other treatments) has significantly higher risk (OR= 2.276, p=0.0082) of legal action. 
Patient's residence, used as an income proxy variable, predicts that patient living m 
middle-income area (OR= 1.792, p=0.0255) has more risk of taking a legal action. 
Sensitivity analysis of logistic regression: We have checked on the model by 
running several tests for misspecification. We begin by using the Hosmer-Lemeshow test 
(p= 0.6904) and the classification table to assess goodness-of-fit, both of which do not 
show any signs of lack of fit. Then we examined the outliers by graphical and numerical 
methods. There are six observations with an absolute value of the Pearson residual and 
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deviance residual greater than 3. Another stricter definition of outlier by change in 
deviance with deletion and change in Pearson chi-square with deletion greater than 3.84 
picks out twenty-five outliers. Despite the significance of most variables being stronger 
and the c-statistics improved a little bit (from 0.838 [original] to 0.843 [deleting one 
outlier, Pearson chi-square >5] to 0.864 [deleting six outliers]) after deleting the outliers, 
we do not take out any outlier after considering the limited sample size, the low 
proportion of outliers (not more than 5% of our study sample) and none of them being 
very far out (only one Pearson chi-square >5). We have also checked the collinearity of 
all independent variables in our fmal model by using a two-step logistic-linear regression 
method with the weights of an information matrix. Apparently, only a pair of variables 
(the number of meetings within care team [proportion of variance= 0.61] and meetings 
between doctors and patient [proportion of variance= 0.4 7]) may potentially cause a 
problem of collinearity. These two variables are somewhat related because when the case 
1s more complicated, it generally takes more meetings to facilitate the internal and 
external communication. However, since these two variables are strongly significant 
(p=0.0384 and <0.0001) and predictive (OR= 1.476 and 2.478), we decide to keep both 
of them in the model. 
In conclusion, by using a risk-adjustment logistic regression model, we establish the 
number of communication meetings between doctor and patient, along with other process, 
clinical, physician characteristic, and incidental factors to be significantly associated with 
the incidence of a malpractice claim developing into a legal action in our hospital. 
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Discussion 
We have collected hundreds of malpractice claims to analyze the association 
between legal action and patient demographics, clinical factors, physician individual 
characteristics and risk management related process and incident factors . Following our 
conceptual framework, we hypothesize that the intention and behavior of managing a 
malpractice claim can be dissected into four domains and therefore, we may be able to 
find out the underlying behavioral mechanism of determining the interaction between 
physicians and patients. To the best of our knowledge, this may be the first paper using 
the Theory of Planned Behavior to predict the probability of legal action developed from 
malpractice claims. Despite the limitations inherited in our study, we discuss the 
significant results in following paragraphs. 
Process factors: Our main results are that process of managing these malpractice 
claims bears a strong association with their legal outcomes. The number of 
communication meetings, whether held internally (within care team) or externally 
(between provider and claimant), actually is strongly correlated with both the complexity 
of incidents and the intensity of patient's or family's emotional reaction. Therefore, the 
number of meetings is strongly related to the risk of legal action, which has never been 
published in the malpractice literature before. One implication of using this finding to 
reduce the incidence of malpractice claim may be to educate physicians to conduct these 
meetings earlier enough to decrease the meetings required after the claims. Then, it could 
be expected to decrease the risk of facing legal action. Although not as obvious as our 
study results, communication problem has been identified as an important etiology of 
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malpractice claims encountered by physicians around the world 25_7. Our results concur 
with these studies that physician's communication skills need to be strengthened, either 
internally or externally, and we may encourage physicians to have more risk-prevention 
communication skill training. 
Sources of reporting a claim: From our risk managing experience, we observe that the 
risk of legal action may be different from various ways of receiving claims. Usually, 
frontline report of an incident indicates a way for those incidents bearing more disastrous 
results to alarm health care providers at first hand to report it. As for physician receiving 
a claim filed from out of hospital directly, that claim generally implies the situation is 
very risky to have a legal action because patient and his/her family do not want to have 
more explanation or any further negotiation. If claims are referred from different offices 
in the institution or patient just comes directly to the incident report office, these cases are 
thought to be less urgent and less risky to face a legal action. Our results demonstrate that 
when compared to claims referred by other sources, a claim reported by frontline 
physicians or nurses directly or filed from an out-of-hospital pathway, has a significantly 
higher risk of facing a legal action against physicians, which was also not reported in the 
medical literature before. But this finding may flag a warning remark for our working 
group that we need to be more careful of dealing with those high-risk cases. 
Patient safety classifications: It has been a recent trend in research to promote the 
quality improvement activity and patient safety monitor to reduce medical error in health 
care and hopefully, to decrease the negligent injury thereby30. RAND Institute for Civil 
Justice has conducted a study in California to look at the effects of patient safety indicator 
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on reducing malpractice claims 3 I· Their results reveal that on average, a county with a 
decrease of 10 patient safety indicated events has 3. 7 less malpractice claims. It is a 
sophisticated study to prove a significant association between patient safety indicators 
and medical malpractice claims quantitatively. Our results of patient safety factors add to 
this direction of study in identifying several specific patient safety factors associated the 
probability of malpractice claim. From our study, we find some risk-enhancing factors 
related to having a legal action: P-SAC3 and P-SAC8. P-SAC3 represents that physicians 
do not follow clinical guidelines, which can always be raised as an argument of 
substandard care predisposing to more legal action. P-SAC8 factor denotes that health 
care providers perform their duty without paying attention to their daily practice. This 
patient safety category actually is tied to the axis of compliance to standard of care or 
clinical guideline. On the contrary, P-SAC6 (Emotional dissatisfaction) is a risk factor 
decreasing the frequency of legal action. Although initially it sounds like a 
counterintuitive argument, when a medical incident is assigned in this patient safety 
category, it generally reflects no obvious medical errors involved in the medical incident. 
These claims are raised mainly because the worsening clinical results or intolerable 
treatment process do not meet patient's high expectation. Because of the limitation of our 
sample size, not all patient safety classifications include enough cases to show its 
significance. We need to continue to collect more claims to explore the interactions 
between these patient safety categories and the risk of having legal action more deeply. 
Physician characteristics: these attributes are reported to be highly related to 
malpractice risk 32 in the literature. Female and older physicians with board-certification 
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are less likely to have malpractice suits. According to one claim-based analysis from New 
Jersey, researchers fmd that malpractice claim rate is significantly different with 
physician's age, with a peak at about 40 years old, which is not far from our study results 
of increasing risk oflegal action at age group from 45 to 55 years old. Another study17 in 
Taiwan, as cited in the literature review session, also showed physicians at age between 
45 and 64 years old had higher risk of medical malpractice, which is similar to our results. 
Patient volume also contributes to physician's malpractice risk because they have 
accumulated a certain amount of patients at their peak period of clinical career30. 
Previous studies showed that resident involved in malpractice claims ranged from 75% in 
emergency medicine35 to 27% in a random sample of mixed specialties34. Resident 
involvement is generally perceived to be more probably related to legal action for they 
are still under training with technical incompetence, which may cause them to commit a 
medical error and injury. Increasing the training for malpractice management skills may 
also help resident to lower down their risk of malpractice claims. 
Incident factors: As compared to patients in outpatient clinics or emergency room, 
those who admitted in the hospital usually are older and sicker, stay longer in the hospital 
and have more complicated clinical condition. All these deteriorated clinical situations, as 
revealed in the literature3o,38, may increase the risk of more legal actions than other 
locations of incident. The negligence categories of NPDB describe the characteristics of 
the medical incident. Several studies 28,30,32 point out that surgical procedures and 
interventional treatments are highly associated with malpractice claims than other clinical 
activities such as diagnosis, treatment or miscellaneous document. Our significant results 
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of NPDB collapsed categories show similar impact of interventional incident on 
increasing malpractice risk. 
Patient's demographics: Rates of adverse events and malpractice claims have been 
reported to increase by patient's age s. Therefore, our finding of lower age group of 
patients having lower legal action is correspondent to previous research in this field. 
Furthermore, according to a study on cultural factors of malpractice claims in Taiwan39, 
traditional family value of respecting parents and elderly is always a major concern of 
families' motivation to raise a malpractice claim. Researchers have been interested in 
studying the association between socioeconomic status and malpractice risk. Using 
income as a proxy to predict medical malpractice risk shows mixed results. Harvard 
malpractice study36 suggested that a patient with high income is more likely to file a 
malpractice claim. But another study2s from Sloan at Duke University showed that 
high-income patient is less likely to decide to sue a physician. Our results indicate that 
patients from middle-income class are significantly associated with higher risk of legal 
action, which sits in the middle of previous two study results. Further study may be 
needed to reconcile these results. 
Time variables: Despite the fact that the third quarter as a dummy variable (the third 
quarter versus the other three quarters) shows significance in the logistic regression 
model, it is not significant for Chi-square test (p= 0.1759) in the bivariate analysis. 
Neither is the variable of quarter, divided as four categories, significant in the Chi-square 
test (p=0.6071 ). Perhaps it is because the third quarter, overall, has a lower rate of legal 
action than others (32/92 [=25.81 %] versus 104/217 [=32.40%]). The frequency of claims 
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in each year looks like there is a trend of increasing. But if we break them down into 
quarters, the distribution of these events shows more like a random fluctuation rather than 
a regular tendency of increasing by time. The only regularity noted in these time charts is 
the first quarter contains nearly the least number of claims (86/445=19.33%), compared 
to all the other quarters in the same year. The major reason behind the phenomenon is 
because, in Taiwan, people celebrate the Lunar New Year, which generally falls between 
January 21 and February 19. Basically, this national holiday is composed of a 10-day 
period without anything happened. Therefore, the activity of malpractice claims also goes 
down significantly during this time interval, which further reduces the number of claims 
in the first quarter of each year. 
Policy implications: Our study results of risk management factors agree with 
current trends of early risk management intervention in medical malpractice literature67 . 
As we mentioned in the discussion session before, if we can prompt these communication 
meetings earlier enough to even before the incident, we may be able to reduce the risk of 
legal action significantly. Combined with another risk-enhancing factor of resident 
involvement, we suggest postgraduate medical educational activities may include more 
communication skill trainings for residents to help them lessen the malpractice risk. Since 
physicians who do not follow clinical guidelines are also related to higher risk of legal 
actions in our study, such teaching opportunities may also consider to include more 
courses in promoting clinical guideline and standard of care, especially for residents in 
their earlier career development. As for risk managers like our malpractice working group, 
frontline report and out of hospital filing documents, physicians of age group between 45 
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to 55 years old and middle income class patients may attract their attention to carefully 
manage their claims. 
Limitations: There are several apparent limitations of this study. First of all, this is a 
retrospective analysis of previous malpractice claims collected. We cannot be certain that 
every medical malpractice claim in our hospital is settled or managed through this 
process. There might be some missing claims which are settled "off the record" by 
physicians themselves without notifying our risk management working group. It can be 
reasonably assumed that these claims are more likely to happen in the beginning of our 
risk management process or in cases where the issues raised are relatively minor. This 
selection bias may cause our study to lose some claim information. But as our risk 
management team becomes well established year by year, we have a strong belief that 
most malpractice claims are reported to our working group. Therefore, this may not be a 
real threat to validity of our study. Secondly, some information related to patient's clinical 
condition, such as the severity of medical injury, patient's initial medical condition and 
patient's clinical outcome, may suffer from judgment bias because all of them are 
subjectively assessed by our group members. Owing to the earlier onset, patient's initial 
disease severity is generally more difficult to be accurately evaluated than the severity of 
medical injury or patient's clinical outcome. Therefore, it is less reliable as compared to 
the other two subjectively assessed clinical factors. Last, despite being the largest known 
series in Taiwan, the limited sample size and the single institution data of our study really 
reduce the generalizability of our study results as compared to other western large scale 
malpractice studies. 
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Up to now, we have applied the Theory of Planned Behavior to analyze medical 
malpractice claims from the perspectives of physicians and the hospital. But the inner 
attitude and subjective norm of physicians are somewhat better measured by 
psychological instruments. As a result, conducting such surveys is important future 
research to reveal the detailed mechanism of physician decisions while facing 
malpractice claims. Another direction for future study is, by presenting our achievements 
in our study from these claims, we want to persuade leaders in other hospitals in Taiwan 
to set up their own risk management teams and collect their own data. With a broader 
participation from various hospitals, we hope we can collect more information about 
malpractice claims and develop more effective solutions to reduce or even prevent these 
malpractice scenarios in Taiwan and other countries. 
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Chapter 2: Understanding the Factors Predicting Compensation Amounts for 
Malpractice Claims in Taiwan 
Background 
Recently, impacted by the awakening of medical consumerism and the patient 
rights movement, historically large amounts of compensation for medical malpractice 
lawsuits have been making headlines in Taiwa14, ,42 . Because these soaring amounts of 
compensation have already become a major burden for medical professionals and 
deterred new physicians from pursuing a career in high-risk specialties such as surgery, 
obstetrics, anesthesiology and emergency medicine 47, similar to the situation in the 
U.S.45 . As a result, policy makers, health administrative officers and health care providers 
in Taiwan are considering reforming the medical malpractice litigation system to control 
malpractice costs. However, before these reforms can take place, the government needs 
more information on the composition of malpractice awards in Taiwan. 
Generally, when encountering a medical injury caused by negligence, patients can 
choose between two ways to seek compensation: to file a lawsuit or to resolve the claim 
by settlement. How this general approach gets operationalized, differs according to rules 
in different countries. Although the relatively high amounts of payments granted by the 
court attract the attention of the public, most paid claims are actually settled without 
going to court. According to published articles in Taiwan, 5 and the United States43, the 
proportion of settled cases among all medical malpractice claims range from 40-70%, 
while lawsuits only comprise 10-15% of them. Understanding the components of these 
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payments will not only reveal elements of the detailed mechanisms determining 
settlements but also inform policies and interventions possibly to set up an affordable and 
reasonable malpractice compensation scheme. 
Previous studies on medical malpractice have been scarce because malpractice 
settlement and lawsuit details were long considered confidential. It was not until the late 
1980's that studies based on data from the US states of California and New York became 
the first wave of research to investigate the interaction between compensation and its 
associated factors 44, 45 . In Taiwan, only in recent years researchers started to take notice 
of this literature and to report on the predictors of malpractice compensation 43 , 48 . As far 
as we know, there is no continuous cohort study collecting data on the detailed behavioral 
mechanisms that determine how malpractice claims are settled in Taiwan. Since we have 
established a medical malpractice claim database in one urban academic medical center 
for 6 years, we are able to investigate the resolution processes and the monetary amounts 
of these compensated claims. Our database aggregates both clinical and claim-based 
information, which further contains factors of risk management processes and highlights 
the interaction between doctors and patient. The features of our database allow us to 
extract detailed measures of behavior; therefore, it becomes possible for us to apply the 
Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB)21 to explain the physician's intention and behavior of 
settling a malpractice claim, which is different from previous studies adopting the 
viewpoints from other parties, such as patients or lawyers. After understanding these 
associated factors , we will try to employ a series of risk-adjustment models to predict the 
compensated payments. 
50 
Literature review: 
Many studies have adopted different theories to explain the predictors of 
compensated amounts for medical malpractice. Two main methods have been used to 
examine the decisions in the resolution process for settlement: the economic approacl40 
and the epidemiological approach36, 48· Traditionally, economists have tended to examine 
the bargaining process with sophisticated econometric techniques to estimate the 
expectation on the returns and costs from patient's side to file a lawsuit or to settle for 
compensation 32. As we mentioned before in paper I, based on the data collected from 
families of adverse birth outcome and patients from emergency room in Florida, Sloan et 
al. 28,40 have developed several risk adjusted models, including linear regression models 
and two-part models, to use economic loss, degree of claimant's liability, and the motives 
for claiming to analyze the differences in compensated claims 40. These models are very 
useful for cost estimation for lawyers and insurance companies, and this study approach 
considers more factors on the patient's side than on the doctor's, which is different from 
our study approach in employing more factors related to physician's side to understand 
the entire settlement process. 
To detect the root cause of medical malpractice and to improve the quality of health 
care, a group of researchers including epidemiologists, law scholars and physicians, 
employed epidemiological approach give more attention to differentiating between 
negligence and adverse events rather than the causes of rising compensated payments 6, 49. 
Their approach is extremely helpful in preventing medical errors but is not always 
directly linked to the study of compensation itself. Because their study methods focus 
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more on expert's review of medical records and independent judgment of negligence, 
their study results usually do not address the risk management process or post-incident 
interactions between physicians and patients. 
Since the payments for compensation in our data are characterized by the presence of a 
significant number of zeros, and by the skewed distribution on nonzero values of payments, to 
manage the extremely skewed malpractice cost data like this, Manning et al. 70 suggested 
that there are two ways to address the data problems: transform the outcome variable (by 
any power, most commonly, square-root or log transform) to deal with skewness or the 
decomposition of the response into several estimation models (the simplest form, 
two-part models). Generally, square-root transform provides a non-negative 
transformation of the outcome, which can still address the skewness in the distribution at 
a certain degree. Log-transformed outcome can improve the power of managing the 
skewness of the distribution. But logged outcome needs to use some negative values to 
replace the zeroes, and when to retransform back to the original values will result in 
retransforming bias71. However, two-part models, which estimate the probability of nonzero 
compensation separately from the level of payments conditional on nonzero compensation, have 
been broadly applied to estimating empirical econometric data such as readmission cost72, length 
of stay or malpractice compensation cost data4o like ours. 
There are fewer studies focusing on malpractice compensation in Taiwan than in 
Western countries. Wu et al. 15, has published an article, based on a hospital-based 
case-control study, they found that malpractice claims with medical injury were more 
likely to reach compensation and to receive higher compensation. The severity of medical 
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injury was also associated with the amount of compensation. Chen et al. has reviewed 
nearly 6,000 judgments from the open database of district court records to obtain all the 
information for malpractice litigation in civil court47 . The results showed, from 2000 to 
2008, only 17% (67/404) of lawsuits are judged in favor of plaintiff (patient's side) and 
the average amount of compensation has been climbing in recent years 69 . 
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Figure 2-1 The theory of planned behavior applied in malpractice claim study to predict 
the amount of compensation in settled cases 
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Following the direction of econometric studies, we try to employ a conceptual 
framework more related to the attributes of personal behavioral decision-making 
determinants to shed new light on the understanding of physician's intention to settle a 
malpractice claim and the amount of compensation accepted, which is similar to the 
mechanism to handle the malpractice claims with possibility of facing legal action in 
Chapter 1. Our framework takes a new standpoint to examine the resolution process of 
settling a claim more from physician's side, which is different from traditional approach 
from patient's side. Because our database was collected through the medical institution 
like a University hospital, we are able to obtain more information about physicians and 
the hospital. Therefore, we can include three major domains of TPB, attitude toward 
behavior, subjective norm and perceived behavior control, to become our conceptual 
model to formulate physician's intention using most of our variables (detailed in Table 2-I 
as a reminder). Although we focus more on physician's determining factors, variables 
from patient's side are also included in the fourth domain as background factors to 
balance our analysis. All the detailed descriptions of THB and its layout of each specific 
variable in our database can be referred to Chapter 1, page 8-12. 
In Table 2-I, we classify all the variables collected in our database relative to each 
category of TPB. This table intends to reveal the correlation of these variables in their 
original grouping in database and the domains of TPB. 
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Table 2-I All explanatory variables classified into four domains of conceptual framework 
Domains Attitude toward behavior Subjective norm Perceived behavior Background factors 
control 
Patient's Age of patients, 
demographics Gender of patients, 
Patient's residence 
Clinical factors Severity of medical injury, Location of incident Patient's prior 
Patient's clinical outcome condition before 
after incident incident 
Process factors Source of report, Number of 
meetings within care team, 
Number of meetings between 
doctor and patients, Number 
of official mails, 
Vl Characteristics Department, More Age of physician, Vl 
of physicians than one claims Gender of physicians, 
Post-graduate status, 
Incident factors NPDB categories, 
Self-paid medical 
procedures 
Patient Safety Communication- axis Unexpected or Compliance-axis Environment- axis 
Classification unavoidable- axis 
*This table was specified by authors. 
As we discussed in Chapter 1, a comprehensive set of variables included in our 
database enables us to develop models from the framework of THB. Applying THB to 
explaining physician's behavior has become more appealing for scholars 24 . The 
advantages of our approach for studying settlements are that it provides a holistic 
viewpoint of the claims resolution process and unbiased information on reaching 
agreement between patients and physicians. Because the settlement process is often 
complicated and the decision on the final amount of compensation is hard to predict, we 
hypothesize that THB can help us better predict the amount of payment based on its 
theoretical framework. 
Using this framework, combined with some features of physicians and institutional 
management process, we test a series of different regression models in order to fmd the 
best model to predict the amount of compensation. This process leads to several testable 
hypotheses: 
H2.1: We hypothesize that factors from the risk management process have 
influences on decision making by physicians to settle the compensation. 
H2.1.1: One pathway of reporting a claim, frontline direct report is hypothesized 
to be more likely to have a higher amount of compensation than others. 
H2.1.2: We also hypothesize that the number of meetings between doctor and 
patient is highly associated with the amount of compensation. 
H2.2 : In the second domain of subjective norm, because there are various risks of 
practice environment and different leadership in each specialty, we hypothesize that 
physicians from certain departments have higher amount of compensation than 
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physicians from other departments. 
H2.3: The characteristics of physicians (the third part of framework- perceived 
behavior control) are hypothesized to be highly associated with the amount of 
compensation. 
H2.3.1: We hypothesize that as physicians get older, they are more likely to have 
higher amount of compensation. 
H2.3.2: We also hypothesize that resident involved in the claim will increase the 
amount of compensation. 
H2.4: In the fourth domain- background factors, we hypothesize that patient's 
demographics are associated with the amount of compensation. 
H2.4.1: If patient's age gets older, it is hypothesized to be associated with more 
amount of compensation. 
Methods 
Outcome variables: Our outcome variable used for multivariate regression models is 
the total compensation amount for paid claims (including payment for settling the case 
and write-off medical cost, all calculated in NTD amount of that nominal year, at a 
currency ratio of about 0.033 US dollar). We do not include any compensation from 
lawsuits not only because during the 6-year period of collecting claims, none of them has 
completed the litigation process and been ruled for compensation, but also because from 
previous study47 in Taiwan, only a small proportion (estimated to be less than 2% among 
all medical malpractice claims) of compensation coming from litigation award. 
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Explanatory variables: Our explanatory variables, which include patient's 
demographics, clinical factors, process factors , characteristics of physicians, incident 
factors and patient safety classifications are all retrieved from exactly the same database 
of Chapter 1. Therefore, we can refer to page 20 to 28 for further explanation. However, 
due to much fewer events of compensation available for the second part model of 
two-part regression analysis, we have further collapsed some variables into fewer 
categories than in Chapter 1. The details of these collapsed variables are listed in Table 
2-II. 
To address the much lower number of nonzero outcomes in Chapter 2, we further 
collapse several categorical variables to keep them at two or three divisions when we are 
fitting the logistic regression model (Table 2-II). Patient's clinical factors such as 
patient's prior condition before incident, the severity of medical injury and patient 's 
clinical outcome after incident are all further grouped into three levels with details of 
grouping listed in Table 2-II. The rest of factors such as location of incident, source of 
reporting a claim, NPDB categories and a proxy variable for patient's income are 
collapsed in the same way as in Chapter 1 (refer to page 37-8). 
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Table 2-II Collapsed categorical variables (used for regression models) 
Collapsed Level Frequency Percentage Cumulative Cumulative 
Variable Frequency Percentage 
Severity of No injury 161 36.18 161 36.18 
medical injury Mild injury 122 27.42 283 63.60 
Moderate and major 142 26.41 445 100.00 
Ill JUry 
Patient's Normal to temporary 232 52.31 232 52.31 
clinical disability 
outcome after Permanent to severe 35 7.86 267 60.00 
incident disability 
Vegetative or dead 178 40.00 445 100.00 
Patient's prior Normal to mildly ill 276 62.02 276 62.02 
condition Moderately to 163 36.63 439 98.65 
before incident severely ill 
Vegetative or dead 6 1.35 445 100.00 
Location of Inpatient 261 58.65 261 58.65 
incident Outpatient 184 41.35 445 100 
(Emergency room and 
Outpatient clinic) 
Source of Direct report to 268 60.22 268 60.22 
reporting a office , internal 
claim referral and referral 
by a top executive 
official 
Frontline report and 177 39.78 445 100.00 
outside filing notice 
NPDB Interventional 309 69.44 309 69.44 
categories Non-interventional 136 30.56 445 100.00 
Zip code into High income 145 32.58 145 32.58 
three regions Middle income 167 37.53 312 70.11 
Low income 133 29.89 445 100.00 
Statistical analysis: Our statistical analysis starts from the descriptive statistics of 
plotting our outcome variable-the amount of compensation along with time variables 
such as year and quarter. Because of its extremely skewed distribution, we also transform 
our outcome variable into its natural logarithm (after adding 0.01 to all compensation 
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amounts to avoid the zeroes) and square root and depict them with the same plotting 
method. For bivariate analysis, we perform Student-t-test for binary variables, Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) test for categorical variables and Pearson correlation analysis for 
continuous variables to examine the association between three forms of our outcome 
variable (original compensation amount for settled claims, square-root-transformed and 
log-transformed compensation) and all other independent variables. 
At the last step of our analysis, we apply a series of ordinary linear regression 
models for three different outcome variables to compare their results among these models 
(criteria for selection of variables: p < 0.25). Because many malpractice claims in our 
database do not have compensation, there are nearly 80% of our outcomes are zeroes. 
Therefore, we also fit two-part regression models for the original amount for these 
compensated claims. In our two-part regression models, the first part estimates the 
probability of positive compensation using logistic regression. The second part estimates 
the amount of compensation among the subgroup of claims with any payment, using 
ordinary linear regression model of the original outcome. The final predictions for the 
two-part models are the estimated probabilities of having any compensated claims times 
the predicted conditional compensation72. We have explored other generalized linear 
models such as Poisson, and Negative binomial regression models for original outcome, 
but the results are not satisfactory and we do no not report them in our results session. A 
set of dummy variables is created to represent different attributes of categorical variables 
when in need for regression analysis. All statistical analyses are performed by SAS 
program version 9.3. 
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Results 
Since the main objective of our study is to select the best risk-adjusted regression 
model, we summarize our main results of the two-part regression models here (Detailed 
results of the models are revealed in Table 2-VI-1 and 2-VI-11), to be the best model to 
predict the amount of compensation in our malpractice database. The first part of the 
two-part model is a logistic regression that predicts the probability of a paid claim. The 
number of meetings between doctor and patients is the most significant among the 
variables ( 4.2 times more odds of having paid claims with every meeting between doctor 
and patient, OR= 4.235, p<0.001; c-statistics= 0.918). The second part is an ordinary 
linear regression model to predict the amounts of these payments. The number of 
meetings variable is again the most significant (every meeting between doctors and 
patient increasing the payment at 0.18 million NTD [R-square= 0.5521]) . 
Descriptive statistics of outcome variables: 
After readers finished reading Chapter 1, it is often confusing for them to understand 
the outcome variables in Chapter 2. Here we try to lay out the difference of outcome 
variables between Chapter 1 and 2 in Table 2-IIIA. In our risk-adjusted models in Chapter 
1, we combine lawsuit and settlement together as the event of legal action, just like the 
big parenthesis including the first two rows of the number of claims on the right side of 
the table. However, in Chapter 2, we focus on the event of settlement (the second row 
only) because it is the only part of our malpractice claims that contains the information of 
final settled payment. Since none of our lawsuits has reached the final results of its 
litigation process, we do not include lawsuits in the analysis of Chapter 2. Therefore, we 
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estimate the statistical models only on compensation for ninety-four settled claims, which 
do not include the payment for forty-two lawsuits. 
Table 2-IIIA The relationship between outcome variable in Chapter 1 (legal action) and 
outcome variable in Chapter 2 (paid claims/settlement) 
Legal action No. ofClaims Litigation outcome No. ofClaims 
Yes 136 Lawsuit 42 r Paper I 
Settlement (Paid claims) 94 Paper II 
No 309 Patient rejects 199 
explanation 
Patient accepts 110 
explanation 
Because only one-fifth of our claims reach a resolution for compensation 
(94/445= 21.12%), most of our outcome variables are zeroes. We have plotted the three 
types of outcomes with zeroes (in Figure 2-2~2-4) at first. The distributions of these 
outcomes appear to be skewed to the right and heavily concentrated around zero or 
negative values. Compared to the original and square-rooted outcome, logged outcome 
(Figure 2-4) is more symmetrically distributed on the positive values. 
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compensation 
Figure 2-2 Distribution of original outcome variable with zeroes 
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Figure 2-3 Distribution of square-root-transformed outcome variables with zeroes 
63 
-4 .5 -3 .0 -1 .5 0.0 1.5 3.0 4.5 6.0 7.5 9.0 10.5 12.0 13.5 15.0 
lcom MIDPOINT 
Figure 2-4 Distribution of log-transformed outcome variables with zeroes 
To examine the plots without zeroes (in Figure 2-5~2-7), we can compare the 
different distributions of these transformed outcomes without the interference of their 
overly concentration on the left side. After depleting all the zeroes, the original outcome 
variable (Figure 2-5) is still skewed to the right while the square-root transformed 
outcome becomes a more uniformly decreasing distribution in Figure 2-6. The logged 
outcome (Figure 2-7) is distributed more similar to the normal distribution, which makes 
it more suitable to fit the ordinary linear regression modeL We also examine its 
relationship with time variable by quarter of each year in Figure 8, which basically shows 
only random scattering of the payment for compensation along the time frame without 
any predictable trends in this 6-year period. 
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Figure 2-6 Distribution of square-root-transformed outcome variables without any zero 
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Figure 2-8 Outcome (original compensation for paid claims) variations by qumters 
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The means and variances of all three outcome variables are shown in Table 2-IIIB 
for comparison. The variance of non-transformed outcome variable is relatively large 
(nearly 1.5 million times) as compared to its mean, which implies its distribution is 
extremely skewed. On the contrary, the log-transformed outcome has a much smaller 
variance than the original outcome. The mean and variance of square-root form lie 
somewhere between them. The skewness of original outcome (6.46) is about two times 
the skewness of square-root form (3 .80) and more than four times the skewness oflogged 
outcome (1.50). The kurtosis of these three types of outcomes has similar scale of change 
after transformation. The detailed descriptive statistics of these three outcomes are listed 
in Table 2-IIIB. The associated single variable analyses of all independent variables can 
be reached in Chapter 1, page 24-8. 
Table 2-IIIB Descriptive statistics for three different outcome variables 
Variables N Mean Variance Standard Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Deviation 
ComEensation 445 82150 1.28El0 357247.3 3669861 6.45657 47.23290 
Square-root 445 94.857 73315.9 270.77 1915.69 3.79984 16.02905 
transformation 
Log -transformation 445 -1.277 42.723 6.536 15.115 1.49763 0.36322 
Bi-variate analysis: 
The results of all bivariate analysis, including Student-t test, ANOVA test and 
correlation test, associated with non-transformed compensation are reported in Table 
2-NA. Some significant variables are discussed as in following paragraphs. 
ANOVA test for clinical factors: The total payment of claim is found to be 
significantly associated with all three clinical factors: the level of medical injury (p < 
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0.001), patient's initial disease severity (p= 0.0378) and the functional status of patient's 
clinical outcome (p = 0.0014). Post-hoc comparison shows patients with major injury 
versus no injury and major injury versus temporary injury are two pairs of comparison 
with significance. For comparing clinical outcome, another two pairs of patients with no 
disability against severe disability and vegetative state are significant. If patient initially 
presents in our hospital as vegetative, the compensation payments are significantly higher 
than all other disease states except those two patients with initial death. Location of 
incident occurrence is another significant clinical factors (p=0.0049), which shows that 
incidents occurring in ward cause more payment than incidents in OPD (by Tuk:ey's post 
hoc test). 
ANOVA test for incident factors: Because of our limited sample size, we adopt the 
variable of a simplified NPDB negligence category with 4 groups for analysis, which 
shows significant association (p= 0.0049) with payment of claim and operation associated 
group (anesthesia, operation and equipment) has significantly higher amount of payment 
than paid claims associated with treatment group (drug, intravenous intervention and 
other treatments) and other group (miscellaneous and obstetrics). 
Student-t test for characteristics of physicians: By using Student-t test, we find that 
the average amount of paid claims associated with other health care practitioners in 
addition to physicians (such as physical therapist, pharmacist, etc.) are significantly lower 
than compensated claims of physicians (p=0.003). Among the 26 departments in our 
hospitals, anesthesiology (p<O.OOOl), internal medicine (p= 0.0157) and oncology (p= 
0.0068) are three departments significantly related to the amount of compensation. All 
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three departments are associated with decreased payment for compensation as compared 
to the rest of departments. 
Student-t test for patient safety classifications: Since these patient safety categories 
are all coded as binary variables, we use Student-t test to compare the different amounts 
of compensation between these claims assigned in each patient safety category and those 
out of that category. The results show that only four categories: P-SACl (No rule nor 
standard of procedure exists in the hospital), P-SAC2 (Providers do not follow the 
standard of procedure), P-SAC6 (Patient feels emotionally dissatisfied with medical 
services) and P-SAC13 (Patient encounters unavoidable complications from medical 
procedure or operation) are significantly related to our outcome variables. Despite the 
significance ofp-value, P-SAC12 (Violation of patient's privacy) was not considered as a 
significant variable because only two cases are coded in this category and both claims are 
not compensated. Most of the other factors show similarly low frequency (only six 
factors have a number of cases more than five percent of total claims), which is the 
reason why such a small number of them are significant in our statistical tests. 
Student's t-test and correlation analysis for process factors: Process factors are also 
significantly related to compensation. The collapsed variable of source of report shows its 
significance (p = 0.0096) in having more payment for claims through frontline report and 
out-of-hospital filing than other pathways, which may be related to the severity of the 
incident, just as their significant association with the frequency of claims. Because the 
other three process factors (the number of meetings within care team, the number of 
communication meetings between patient and physicians and the number of official 
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letters) are continuous variables, we employ correlation analysis to show that both factors 
are highly significantly associated with compensation (Pearson correlation coefficient r = 
0.28 and 0.45, respectively, with p-value both < 0.0001). After examining the correlation 
matrix, we find out that these two factors also have a high correlation between them (r= 
0.49, p<O.OOOl), which may cause some specification problems of collinearity when 
fitted into a regression model. 
ANOVA test for time variables (year, quarter, and month): To test the significance of 
the association among sum of paid claims and time variables, we use ANOVA and 
Tukey's method for post-hoc multiple comparison testing. Our outcome variable, 
payment for claim, does not tum out to be associated with year or quarter from our 
ANOVA analysis. 
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Table 2-IVA Bivariate analysis for non-transformed outcome and associated factors with 
significant results- Student t-test and ANOVA 
Domain Variable Specified N DF Value of P-value Significance of 
statistics& Post-hoc 
multiple 
comparison 
(Tuke ) 
Attitude Severity of 4 groups 445 3 7.29 <.0001* No# 
toward medical injury Minor$ 
behavior Moderate 
Ma'or #$ 
Patient's 6 groups 445 5 4.19 0.0010* Normal #$ 
clinical Temporary 
outcome after Permanent 
incident Severe# 
Vegetative $ 
Dead 
Number of continuous 445 0.27669 <.0001 * 
meetings within 
care team 
Number of continuous 445 0.44911 <.000 1 * 
communication 
meetings 
between doctor 
and Eatient 
Source of 2 groups 445 1 -2.61 0.0096* 
reporting a 
claim 
Patient safety P-SAC11 445 1 1.66 0.0979 
classification 
Subjective Department Anesthesiology 445 4.64 <.0001 * 
norm Internal 445 1 2.43 0.0157* 
Medicine 
Obstetrics and 445 1 -1.56 0.1332 
Gynecology 
Oncology 445 1 2.83 0.0068* 
Otolaryngolog~ 445 1 -1.76 0.0955 
Surgery 445 1 1.48 0.1401 
Patient safety P-SAC 6 445 1 4.37 <.0001 * 
classification P-SAC13 445 1 -2.36 0.0209* 
Perceived Post-graduate Nursing 445 1.39 0.1682 
behavior status Others 445 4.40 <.0001 * 
control Age group of 4 groups 445 3 1.79 0.1486 
hysicians 
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Back-
ground 
factors 
Location of 3 groups 
incident 
Patient safety P-SAC 2 
classification P-SAC12 
Gender of Binary 
patient 
Patient's 6 groups 
clinical 
condition 
before incident 
NPDB category 4 groups 
Patient safety P-SACl 
classification 
445 2 
445 1 
445 1 
445 1 
445 5 
445 3 
445 
5.38 0.0049* Inpatient# 
Outpatient # 
Emergency 
2.12 0.0376* 
4.87 <.0001 * 
1.38 0.1680 
2.38 0.0378* Normal# 
Mildly ill$ 
Moderately ill"' 
Severely ill ! 
Vegetative #$"'! 
Dead 
4.35 0.0049* Operation#$ 
Treatment# 
Diagnosis 
Miscellaneous$ 
4.87 <.0001 * 
Three income 3 groups 445 2 1.45 0.2366 
levels 
& Value of statistics: The number of this column represents t- value for Student-t test, 
correlation coefficient r for Pearson correlation test or F-value for F-test. 
*p<0.05 
#, $, "', ! : Significance of post-hoc comparison between each specific pair of levels within 
each variable 
The bivariate analysis of the square-root transformed outcome is largely similar to 
the results of the original outcome variable with a slight difference in the significant pairs 
of multiple comparisons. Because the results are quite close to the non-transformed 
outcome, we will just describe the only new significant variable: patient safety 
classification P-SAC 4 (Providers understand the rules but do not follow it) here, which 
belongs to the domain of perceived behavior control. The results of this bivariate analysis 
can be referred to Table 2-NB. 
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Table 2-IVB Bivariate analysis for square root-transformed outcome and associated 
factors with significant results- Student t-test and ANOVA 
Domain Variable Specified N DF Value of P-value Significance of 
statistics& Post-hoc multiple 
Attitude Severity of 4 groups 445 3 8.04 
toward medical injury Minor 
behavior Moderate$ 
Major# 
Patient's 6 groups 445 5 3.35 0.0056* Normal #$ 
clinical TemEorary 
outcome after Permanent 
incident Severe# 
Vegetative $ 
Dead 
Number of continuous 445 0.33482 <.0001 * 
meetings within 
care team 
Number of continuous 445 0.50877 <.0001 * 
communication 
meetings 
between doctor 
and Eatient 
Source of 2 groups 445 1 -3.27 0.0012* 
reporting a 
claim 
Patient safety P-SACll 445 1 1.23 0.2208 
classification 
Subj ective Department Anesthesiolog~ 445 3.66 0.0010* 
norm Internal 445 2.03 0.0437* 
Medicine 
Obstetrics and 445 1 -1.77 0.0909 
G~necology 
Oncology 445 1 1.52 0.1509 
Otolaryngology 445 1 -1.80 0.0895 
Patient safety P-SAC5 445 1 -1.51 0.1334 
classification P-SAC6 445 1 6.12 <.0001 * 
P-SAC13 445 -2 .52 0.0136* 
Perceived Post -graduate Others 445 2.24 0.0313* 
behavior status 
control Location of 3 groups 445 2 6.00 0.0027* lnEatient # 
incident Out,eatient # 
Emergency 
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Back-
ground 
factors 
Patient safety P-SAC3 
classification P-SAC4 
P-SAC 8 
P-SAC12 
Gender of Binary 
atient 
Patient' clinical 6 groups 
condition 
before incident 
NPDB category 4 groups 
Patient safety P-SAC1 
classification 
Three income 3 groups 
levels 
445 1 
445 1 
445 1 
445 1 
445 1 
445 5 
445 3 
445 1 
445 2 
-1.75 0.0816 
-2.00 0.0462* 
-1.39 0.1652 
7.41 <.0001 * 
1.55 0.1228 
2.01 0.0758 
6.03 0.0005* Operation#$"' 
Treatment# 
Diagnosis "' 
Miscellaneous$ 
7.41 <.0001 * 
2.45 0.0871 
& Value of statistics: The number of this column represents t- value for Student-t test, 
correlation coefficient r for Pearson correlation test or F-value for F-test. 
*p<0.05 
#, $, "', ! : Significance of post-hoc comparison between each specific pair of levels within 
each variable 
From observing previous plots of different outcomes, we can find that the 
distribution of log-transformed outcome is more similar to normal distribution than others. 
Therefore, log-transformed outcome is less likely to violate the assumption of normally 
distributive error terms in the ordinary linear regression model, and is better fit to the 
models with more independent variables included. For process factors, the number of 
official letters filed is tested by Pearson correlation analysis to be significantly correlated 
with the compensation (r- 0.13, p=0.0066). Otolaryngology (p=0.0379) and radiology 
(p=O.Ol03) are two specialties having significantly higher compensation payments than 
other specialties. Resident involvement is another variable of characteristics of physicians 
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to show significance (p= 0.0093). Despite being borderline significant, the variable 
denoting physicians with more than one claim in our database is also associated with 
lower payment for compensation (p= 0.0589). Patient safety classification P-SAC3 
(Providers do not follow clinical guideline) (p= 0.0012) and P-SAC8 (Practitioners are 
inattentive to medical practice) (p= <0.001) are two other variables showing significantly 
lower amount of compensation. The only significant variable from patient's 
demographics is income proxy (p=0.0189), which, after post-hoc testing, shows that 
patients from high-income area have significantly lower compensation than those from 
middle income area. 
Regression model: linear regression models fitted with three forms of outcome variables 
(selection criteria: p<0.25) 
After applying our conceptual framework to explain the payment amount of claims, we 
test the three forms of outcome variables through consecutive model construction. The 
first set of linear regression models use non-transformed compensation amount as the 
outcome variable for model, listed in Table 2-VA. The first part of our framework is 
attitude toward behavior, where we find two process factors and one clinical factor are 
associated with outcome significantly. The number of meeting between doctor patient 
communication (parameter estimate = 170,100, p<0.001) is the strongest explanatory 
variable from the risk management process, which implies every time when one more 
such meeting is needed, it will cost an increment of compensation at about one hundred 
and seventy thousand NTD (= $ 5,667 in USD, currency ratio: NTD/ USD= 30/1 ). If a 
claim comes from frontline report or filing a legal notice out of hospital (parameter 
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estimate = 53,318, p=0.0709), it also increases the payment for compensation. For those 
patients suffer a major medical injury during our clinical management, the amounts of 
compensation are also higher than those who without maj or injury (parameter estimate= 
57,589, p=0.0894). 
Table 2-IVC Bivariate analysis for log-transformed outcome and associated factors with 
significant results- Student t-test andANOVA 
Domain Variable Specified N DF Value of P-value Significant 
statistics& Post-hoc 
multiple 
comparison 
(Tuke ) 
Attitude Severity of medical 4 groups 445 3 7.40 <.000 1 * No #$/\ 
toward InJury Minor A 
behavior Moderate$ 
Ma"or# 
Patient's clinical 6 groups 445 5 3.38 0.0053* Normal# 
outcome after Temporary#$ 
incident Permanent 
Severe 
Vegetative 
Dead$ 
Number of continuous 445 0.24988 <.0001 * 
meetings within 
care team 
Number of continuous 445 0.40080 <.000 1 * 
communication 
meetings between 
doctor and patient 
Number of official continuous 445 0.12858 0.0066* 
letters 
Source of reporting 2 groups 445 1 -3 .88 0.0001 * 
a claim 
Patient safety P-SACll 445 1 1.54 0.1248 
classification 
Subjective Department Genetic 445 1 -1.67 0.0949 
norm Medicine 
Health 445 -1.59 0.1133 
Examination 
Center 
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Internal 445 2.23 0.0271 * 
Medicine 
Obstetrics 445 1 -1.87 0.0747 
and 
Gynecology 
Otolaryngo- 445 1 -2.08 0.0379* 
logy 
Radiology 445 1 -2.58 0.0103* 
Patient safety P-SAC5 445 -1.54 0.1254 
classification P-SAC6 8.06 <.0001 * 
P-SAC13 445 1 -2.17 0.0322* 
More than one Binary 445 1.89 0.0589 
claim 
Perceived Post-graduate status Resident 445 1 -2.61 0.0093* 
behavior Location of incident 3 groups 445 2 1.90 0.1512 
control Patient safety P-SAC3 445 1 -3 .27 0.0012* 
classification P-SAC4 445 1 -2.72 0.0067* 
P-SAC8 445 1 -5 .03 <.0001 * 
P-SAC12 445 1 10.79 <.0001 * 
Back- Patient's clinical 6 groups 445 5 3.81 0.0022* Normal# 1\ 
ground condition before Mildly ill$ 
factors incident Moderately ill $/\ 
Severel;r ill # 
Vegetative 
Dead 
NPDB category 4 groups 445 3 5.92 0.0006* OEeration #$ 
Treatment 
Diagnosis# 
Miscellaneous $ 
Patient safety P-SAC1 445 1 10.80 <.0001 * 
classification P-SAC9 445 1 -1.77 0.0779 
Three income levels 3 groups 445 2 4.00 0.0189* Low# 
Middle 
High# 
& Value of statistics: The number of this column represents t- value for Student-t test, 
correlation coefficient r for Pearson correlation test or F-value for F-test. 
*p<O.OS 
#, $, 1\ , ! : Significance of post-hoc comparison between each specific pair oflevels within 
each variable 
Subjective norm is the second domain of our framework and we find that two 
departments- otolaryngology (parameter estimate = 279,528, p=O.OOOl) and obstetrics 
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and gynecology (parameter estimate = 211 ,363, p=0.0709) enter our linear regression 
model significantly with about two hundred thousand NTD more than the other 
departments. The other significant factor in this domain is patient safety classification 
P-SAC13 (complication of medical procedure or operation: parameter estimate= 105,995, 
p=0.007), which also increases the payment about one hundred thousand NTD if a claim 
being assigned with this factor. 
For the third part of our framework, perceived behavior control, there are two 
middle-aged groups of physicians (35~45 and 45~55 years old) are significantly 
associated with outcome. These two groups have about the same size of impact on the 
model (parameter estimate= 75,447, p=0.0241 for age group of 35~45; parameter 
estimate= 80,790, p=0.0288 for age 45~55) , which are also both positive predictors of 
compensation. 
Background factors belong to the last part of our model, which contain one 
clinical condition (patient's initial presentation as being vegetative; parameter estimate= 
431 ,513, p=0.0045) and patient safety classification P-SAC9 (Uncontrollable 
environment; parameter estimate= 478,610, p=O.OOOl), both risk-enhancing factors to 
increase the payment amount of compensation. 
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Table 2-VA Linear regression model for non-transformed outcome (p < 0.25) 
Variable Parameter Standard t Value Pr > ltl 
estimate Error 
Intercept -137902 34039 -4.05 <.0001 
Attitude Source of Report: Frontline report 53318 29452 1.81 0.0709 
toward and Outside Filing 
behavior Number of communication 170100 19581 8.69 <.0001 * 
meetings between doctor and 
patient 
Patient's clinical outcome: 95071 72739 1.31 0.1919 
permanent disability 
Patient's clinical outcome: severe 118324 75667 1.56 0.1186 
disability 
Patient 's major medical injury 57859 33986 1.70 0.0894 
Subjective P-SAC13 Complication of 105995 39141 2.71 0.0070* 
norm medical Erocedure or OEeration 
Otolaryngology 279528 72676 3.85 0.0001 * 
Obstetrician and Gynecology 211363 66656 3.17 0.0016* 
Perceived Age grouE of doctors {35~45) 75447 33335 2.26 0.0241 * 
behavior Age group of doctors (45~55) 80790 36820 2.19 0.0288* 
control 
Background Age grou.e of patient (<18) -76309 47509 -1.61 0.1090 
factors Gender of Eatient -35044 29171 -1.20 0.2303 
Patient's prior condition: 431513 151035 2.86 0.0045* 
vegetative 
NPDB-Operation, anesthesia and 38496 30798 1.25 0.2120 
equiEment 
P-SAC9 Uncontrollable 478610 96630 4.95 <.0001 * 
Environment 
R-square: 0.3489 
Adjusted R-square: 0.3261 
*: p < 0.05 
The results of square-root transformed compensation are listed in Table 2-VB. 
Overall, this model looks similar to the non-transformed model, with only a few changes 
in the third domain, perceived behavior control. We only address those variables newly 
presented significantly in current transformed model here. Without any addition of new 
significant variables in the first part of model, attitude toward behavior, the variables in 
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this domain are the same as the non-transformed model. In the second domain of our 
framework, subjective norm, we have one more department, anesthesiology, shows a 
negative impact on the compensation at borderline significance in the model (parameter 
estimate= -133.64211 , squared form= 17,860.2, p=0.0582). As for the third part of model, 
perceived behavior control, instead of age group of physicians, two patient safety 
classification P-SAC 4 (Providers understand the rules but do not following them; 
parameter estimate = 215.32834, squared form= 46,366.3, p=0.0551) and P-SAC 8 
(Practitioners are inattentive to medical practice; parameter estimate= 75.77581 , squared 
form= 5,742.0, p=0.0838) significantly increase the paid amount of compensation. The 
significant variables added in background factors contain one collapsed variable for 
NPDB negligence categories (for operation, anesthesia and equipment), and two patient 
demographics (younger age group [ < 18 years old] and male) and one clinical factor 
(patient initially presented as vegetative), with the last three factors being only borderline 
significant. Operation associated NPDB category (parameter estimate= 230.46533 , 
squared form= 53,114.3, p=0.0400) and vegetative patient (parameter estimate= 
261.03466, squared form= 68,139.1 , p=0.0872) are both risk-enhancing factors to 
increase the payment amount of compensation. On the other hand, patients of younger 
age (parameter estimate= -63.08972, squared form= 3,980.3, p=0.0740) and male 
(parameter estimate= -38.39720, squared form= 1,474.3, p=0.0778) will have less 
compensated amounts than the others. 
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Table 2-VB Linear regression model for square-root transformed compensation (p < 0.25) 
Variable Parameter Standard t Value Pr > ltl 
estimate Error 
Intercept -59.36352 28.56145 -2.08 0.0383 
Attitude Source of Report: Frontline report 48.18010 22.01236 2.19 0.0292* 
toward and Outside Filing 
behavior Number of meetings for discussion 25.81095 16.29995 1.58 0.1141 
within care team 
Number of communication 145.73262 16.10145 9.05 <.0001 * 
meetings between doctor and 
atient 
Patient's clinical outcome: 37.76226 29.78751 1.27 0.2056 
temeorary disability 
Patient's clinical outcome: 77.49075 54.31799 1.43 0.1544 
eermanent disabilit~ 
Subjective P-SAC6 Emotionall~ dissatisfied -31.32633 24.51198 -1.28 0.2019 
norm P-SAC13 Complication of medical 60.29989 30.21056 2.00 0.0466* 
erocedure or oeeration 
Otolaryngology 162.69395 53 .78185 3.03 0.0026* 
Obstetrician and Gynecology 122.92406 49.22532 2.50 0.0129* 
Anesthesiology -133.64211 70.36964 -1.90 0.0582 
Perceived P-SAC4 Understand the rules but 215.32834 111.96912 1.92 0.0551 
behavior not following them 
control P-SAC8 Inattention to medical 75.77581 43.72854 1.73 0.0838 
ractice 
Background Age group ofeatient (<18) -63 .08972 35.22546 -1 .79 0.0740 
factors male patient -38.39720 21.71668 -1.77 0.0778 
NPDB-Operation, anesthesia, 230.46533 111.87567 2.06 0.0400* 
equiEment 
Patient's Erior condition: vegetative 40.09275 23 .38804 1.7 1 0.0872 
P-SAC9 Uncontrollable 26 1.03466 71.32332 3.66 0.0003* 
Environment 
Low income area 37.57144 26.77289 1.40 0.1612 
Middle income area 35.28027 25.90069 1.36 0.1739 
R-square : 0.3879 
Adjusted R-square: 0.3605 
*: p < 0.05 
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To compare to previous two models, log-transformed model (in Table 2-VC) brings 
quite different variables in the model. In the first part of model, patients suffered from 
minor medical injury (parameter estimate= 1.60012, p=0.0079) and patients having 
temporary disability as clinical outcome (parameter estimate= 2.74118, p=0.002) receive 
significantly more payments than other level of medical injury and clinical outcome. For 
the second part of our framework, subjective norm, most of the significant variables have 
changed. Patient safety classification P-SAC6 (Emotionally dissatisfaction with medical 
services: parameter estimate= -1.61403 , p=0.0046) and four totally different department 
dummy variables (Urology: parameter estimate= -2.67081 , p=0.0295, Genetic Medicine: 
parameter estimate= 15.39017, p=0.0039, Nuclear Medicine: parameter estimate= 
-7.62550, p=0.0039, and Health Examination Center: parameter estimate= 11.547979, 
p=0.0344) are all significantly included in the model. For the third part of framework, 
perceived behavior control, between two patient safety classifications, only P-SAC3 
(Practitioners do not following clinical guidelines: parameter estimate= 4.13365, 
p=0.0240) is a new factor significantly increasing log-transformed outcome. In the 
domain of background factors, patients living in the middle income area have higher 
compensated payments at borderline significance (parameter estimate= 1.00563, 
p=0.0562). Another treatment related NPDB category (drug, intravenous intervention and 
other treatments: parameter estimate= 1.05266, p=0.0988) is also a borderline significant 
risk-increasing predictor. 
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Table 2-VC Linear regression model for log-transformed compensation (p < 0.25) 
Variable Parameter Standard t Value Pr > Jtl 
estimate Error 
Intercept -5.62883 0.65359 -8.61 <.0001 
Attitude Source of Report: Frontline 1.38054 0.52503 2.63 0.0089* 
toward report and Outside Filing 
behavior Number of communication 3.27665 0.34285 9.56 <.0001 * 
meetings between doctor and 
atient 
Patient's clinical outcome: 2.74 118 0.72363 3.79 0.0002* 
temEorary disability 
Patient's clinical outcome: 2.06690 1.28807 1.60 0.1093 
Eermanent disabilit~ 
Minor medical injury 1.60012 0.59983 2.67 0.0079* 
Subjective P-SAC6 Emotionally -1.61403 0.56598 -2.85 0.0046* 
norm Dissatisfaction 
Urology -2.67081 1.22247 -2.18 0.0295 * 
Obstetrician and Gynecolog~ 1.72893 1.14449 1.51 0.1316 
Radiolog~ 2.66655 1.41833 1.88 0.0608 
Genetic medicine 15.30917 5.27312 2.90 0.0039* 
Nuclear medicine -7.62550 3.83626 -1.99 0.0475* 
Health Examination Center 11.54979 5.44366 2.12 0.0344* 
Perceived Other jzersonnel involved 1.81420 1.43838 1.26 0.2079 
behavior P-SAC3 Not following clinical 4.13365 1.82425 2.27 0.0240* 
control guidelines 
P-SAC4 Understand the rules but 6.41912 2.69798 2.38 0.0178* 
not following them 
P-SAC8 Inattention to medical 4.97479 1.04110 4.78 <.0001 * 
ractice 
Background Age grouE ofEatient (<18) -1.22431 0.84642 -1.45 0.1488 
factors NPDB-Operation, anesthesia, 1.61103 0.64204 2.51 0.0125* 
and equijzment 
NPDB-Drug, intravenous 1.05266 0.63634 1.65 0.0988 
intervention, other treatments 
P-SAC7 Unsafe environment 2.78868 2.39985 1. 16 0.2459 
without imErovement 
Middle income area 1.00563 0.5251 1 1.92 0.0562 
R-square: 0.3927 
Adjusted R-square: 0.3625 
*: p < 0.05 
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Two-part regressiOn models: Using the event of settlement (Settled claims=1, 
others=O; N= 445) as the outcome variable for our first part of logistic regression model, 
it fits much better than previous linear regression models (in Table 2-VII-I, c-statistics= 
0.912) with most of the explanatory variables being highly significant. The first domain 
of our conceptual framework brings in a new protective process factor, the number of 
official letters (OR= 0.579, p=0.0317), which means the chance of reaching a settlement 
decreases as more letters for explanation sent out. The second part of model contains four 
significant risk-reducing variables: P-SAC6 (emotionally dissatisfaction; OR= 0.145, p= 
0.0002), department of internal medicine (OR= 0.396, p=0.0436), department of Urology 
(OR= 0.037, p=0.0071) and physicians with more than one claim (OR= 0.536, p=0.0634). 
In the third domain of perceived behavior control, the additional significant association is 
that the younger doctors (< 35 year old) have lower risk of being involved in a settled 
claims (OR= 0.295, p=0.0213). Background factors, the last domain of our framework, 
have included three more significant factors in the model. Patients of older age (>50 
years old; OR= 2.431, p=0.0081) and initially being normal or mildly ill (OR= 6.137, 
p<0.0001) are more likely to receive a compensation payment, while those living in 
lower income area are less likely to settle claims (OR= 0.387, p=0.0131). 
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Table 2-VI-1 Two-part regression models: 
First part- Logistic regression model for the chance of receiving compensation (selection 
criteria: p<0.25) 
Variable Odds Ratio Point 95% Wald chi-square Pr > Chisq 
Estimate Confidence Limits of 
Odds Ratio 
Intercept -3.5664 <.0001 
Attitude Source of Report: 2.491 1.324 4.684 0.0046* 
toward Frontline Report and Out of 
behavior hosEital filing 
Number of communication 4.235 2.767 6.483 <.0001 * 
meetings between doctor 
and patient 
Number of official letter 0.579 0.352 0.953 0.0317* 
Minor medical injury 3.239 1.592 6.590 0.0012* 
Subjective P-SAC 6 Emotionally 0.145 0.052 0.399 0.0002* 
norm Dissatisfaction 
Physician with more than 0.536 0.277 1.036 0.0634 
one claims 
Internal Medicine 0.396 0.161 0.974 0.0436* 
Urology 0.037 0.003 0.409 0.0071 * 
Perceived Resident 1.584 0.754 3.327 0.2246 
behavior P-SAC 3 Not following 22.920 2.430 216.137 0.0062* 
control clinical guidelines 
P-SAC8 Inattention to 5.517 2.061 14.766 0.0007* 
medical Eractice 
Age grou.e ofDr. (<35) 0.295 0.105 0.834 0.0213* 
Background Age grou.e of .eatient (>50) 2.431 1.260 4.692 0.0081 * 
factors Initially normal or mildly ill 6.137 2.685 14.026 <.0001 * 
patient 
P-SAC7 Unsafe 3.632 0.490 26.935 0.2070 
environment without 
im2rovement 
High Income Area 0.387 0.183 0.819 0.0131* 
c-statistics: 0. 912 
*p<0.05 
Although only the payments of those settled claims are used as the outcome variable 
in our second part model, it seems to fit as well as the first part with more proportion of 
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vanance explained than previOus one-step linear regressiOn models (Table 2-VII-II, 
R-square= 0.5521, compare to the R-squares ofprevious three models ranged from 0.35 
to 0.39). However, we further collapse several clinical variables (severity of medical 
injury, patient's clinical outcome after incident and patient's prior clinical condition 
before incident are all collapsed into three categories) to adapt the even smaller sample 
size of model fitting at this stage. In contrast to the first part model, among those already 
settled claims, patients' outcome with permanent to severe disability (parameter 
estimate= 397,006, p=0.073) and those who suffer from moderate to major medical injury 
(parameter estimate= 332,284, p=0.0153) have significantly higher payment for 
compensation. In the domain of subjective norm, claims assigned with patient safety 
classification P-SAC13 (complication of medical procedure or operation: parameter 
estimate= 231,485, p=0.0840) also have higher payments than other claims. In the third 
part of our framework, perceived behavior control, physicians of oldest age group (>55 
years old: parameter estimate= -270,465, p=0.0485) are likely to pay less amount for 
compensation than other age groups. In background factors, in addition to the patient 
safety classification P-SAC 9 (uncontrollable environment), no other new factor is 
identified as a significant predictor. 
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Table 2-VI-II Two-part regression models: 
Second part- Linear regression model of the amount of compensation for all claims 
settled (Selection criteria: p<0.25) 
Variable Parameter Standard t-Value Pr > Jtl 
estimate Error 
Intercept -71828 80505 -0.89 0.3748 
Attitude Source of repmiing a claim: -361979 235168 -1.54 0.1275 
toward referred by top executive 
behavior officials 
Number of communication 187349 55538 3.37 0.0011* 
meetings between doctor and 
atient 
Permanent to severe 397006 218666 1.82 0.0730 
disabilit 
Moderate to major medical 332284 134256 2.47 0.0153* 
1ll 
Subjective P-SAC13 Complication of 231485 132391 1.75 0.0840 
norm medical procedure or 
OEeration 
Otolaryngologi: 665372 202661 3.28 0.0015* 
Obstetrician and 513212 180414 2.84 0.0056* 
Gynecologi: 
Perceived Age group of doctors (>55) -270465 135074 -2.00 0.0485* 
behavior 
control 
Background P-SAC 9 Uncontrollable 812091 274369 2.96 0.0040* 
factors Environment 
R-square: 0.5521 
Adjusted R-square: 0.5041 
*p<0.05 
In addition to previous results, we have also tested out all possible Generalized 
Linear Models such as Poisson and Negative Binomial regression models with various 
transformations. As a whole, Poisson regression models seem to be overfitting, while 
Negative Binomial regression models tend to have the problems of overdispersion. Since 
the results of these generalized linear models are far from being satisfactory, we do not 
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report them here. For those regression models reported above, judged by the numbers of 
significant predictors, the goodness-of-fit statistics (adjusted R-square) and other 
diagnostics of these regression models, the two-part model is concluded to be the best 
model, which predicts both the frequency of settlement as well as the amount of 
compensation in our dataset in two-step. Therefore, we only perform the sensitivity 
analysis of two-part regression model and the materials in our discussion session are all 
related to the results of two-part regression model. 
Sensitivity analysis of two-part regression models: 
Logistic regression model: We have checked on the model by running several 
diagnostic tests for specification errors. To begin with, we conduct the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test (p= 0.8868) and the classification table with ROC curve. We find 
these goodness-of-fit tests do not indicate any signs of lack of fit. Then we examine the 
outliers by plotting residuals on several graphs and printing out observations using a 
variety of extreme values of residual statistics. By setting the margin for identifying 
outliers at absolute value of the Pearson residual and deviance residual greater than 3, we 
have five observations lying outside of this margin and one of these absolute values of 
the Pearson chi-square residual is even greater than 5 (Pearson chi-square residual= 
5.54550). Despite the significance of most variables being stronger and the c-statistics 
being improved a little bit (from 0.912 [original] to 0.915 [deleting one outlier, Pearson 
chi-square >5] to 0.917 [deleting five outliers]) after deleting the specified outliers, we 
ultimately choose not to remove any outliers after considering the limited sample size and 
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the low proportion of outliers (not more than 5% of our study sample). We have also 
checked the collinearity of all independent variables in our final model by using a 
two-step logistic-linear regression method with the weights from an information matrix. 
Apparently, only one pair of variables (resident involved [proportion of variance= 0.40] 
and the first age group of physician (<35) [proportion ofvariance= 0.42]) may potentially 
cause a problem of collinearity, because nearly all residents are less than 35 years old, 
these two variables actually are in a way correlated. However, although the correlation 
effect is not strong (still <0.50), but the variable of resident involvement (OR= 1.584, 
p=02246) is not significant, ultimately we will be throwing it out of our final model. 
Linear regression model: The specification errors for regression diagnostics for 
linear regression models are much easier to check. To begin with the goodness-of-fit tests, 
the R-square (0.5521) and adjusted R-square (0.5041) are satisfactory, and the model is 
significant with the F -value for 11.50 (p<O.OOO 1 ), both of which indicate no signs of lack 
of fit. Then we examine the outliers and leverage points by plotting residuals on several 
graphs such as Cook's distance and Studentized residual against leverage. There is only 
one observation (#22) with Cook's distance greater 0.2 (0.6), which is also a leverage 
point. By setting the border of identifying outliers at an absolute value of Studentized 
residual greater than 2, we have five observations lying outside of this border and the 
value of the Studentized residual of observation 37 is even greater than 4. Because there 
are not any highly extreme values among these outliers, we ultimately choose not to 
remove any outliers after considering the limited sample size and the low proportion of 
outliers (not more than 5% of our study sample). We have also checked the collinearity of 
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all independent variables in our final model by running the collinearity diagnostic tests. 
Apparently, only two pairs of variables (the number of meetings between doctors and 
patient [proportion of variance= 0.62] and patient suffering from permanent to major 
medical injury [proportion of variance= 0.75]; patient's clinical outcome being moderate 
to severe [proportion of variance= 0.65] and P-SAC 9: uncontrollable hospital 
environment [proportion of variance= 0.45]) may potentially cause a collinearity problem, 
because for the first pair of collinearity, most patients with more serious injuries will need 
more meetings to go through the resolution process. Because claims assigned with 
P-SAC 9 usually cause a certain degree of injuries, these claims have higher risk to result 
in moderate to severe outcomes (the percentage of P-SAC 9: 2/7=28.57% for moderate to 
severe outcomes versus 2/87=2.3% for all other outcomes). However, since these four 
variables are both strongly significant (p=0.0384 and <0.0001) and predictive (OR= 
1.476 and 2.478), we have decided to keep them all in the model. 
Discussion 
In spite of the extremely skewed distribution of our data, we are fortunate to find an 
acceptable two-step regression model to explore associations between the settled 
compensation and the clinical predetermining factors such as patient demographics, 
clinical factors , and characteristics of physician as well as incident factors and the risk 
management process factors . Along with our conceptual framework, we succeed in our 
attempt to find associations between the amount of compensation and variables in our 
database such as risk management process factors, clinical factors, patient safety factors, 
characteristics of physicians and patient demographics. Sloan and Hsiel43 have done a 
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similar two-step analytic approach to predict the probability and the amount of paid 
claims in a study on birth injury patients from Florida. Similar to our study results, they 
find that the liability of physicians (like patient safety classification in our database) and 
patient's age are significantly related to the occurrence of paid claims, while patient's 
negligence (near our clinical factors of the severity of patient's initial condition) and the 
severity of medical damage are related to the claim payments. But their explanatory 
variables do not include risk management process factors, incident factors or 
characteristics of physicians as compared to our model. With a sample size of about 6000 
patients, the proportion of variance explained by the linear regression model is about 50%, 
about the same level as our model. 
Management process: The most important results in our study are the significant 
associations between process factors and the incidence of paid claims. The number of 
communication meetings between providers and claimant is the only significant factor 
related to both the probability and the payment of these settled cases. This strong 
correlation is revealed by high Pearson correlation coefficients and confirmed in both 
models as a risk-enhancer to increase the probability and severity of having paid claims. 
This variable explicitly denotes the complicated nature of these compensated claims: the 
number of communication meetings being held generally is related to the degree of 
patient's loss and profound despair. However, these communication meetings also 
exhaust most of our human resources and time cost in risk management process. 
Therefore, if we can come up with any innovative proposal to reduce the number of such 
meetings, it might represent a possibly effective risk management modality to control 
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compensation. One possible solution might be to persuade physicians to have these 
meetings as early and complete as possible after the claims being raised. Then it may 
lower the chance of facing paid claims and economic loss. Sending out official 
explanation letters is also one way of communication to reduce the incidence of paid 
claims so. 
Sources of reporting a claim: Just as the reason stated in our first model, frontline 
report of incidents and claims filed from out of hospital might directly highlight the risk 
of economic loss being increased. Despite being insignificant, claims referred by top 
executive officials carry a trend for lower payments for compensation when already in the 
settlement process. This may imply the influence of these administrative leaders or some 
other social network factors. We may need more data to really understand the truth 
hidden in this tendency of association. 
Clinical factors: Patients suffering from minor medical injury and having normal to 
mild illness as prior clinical condition before incident are two clinical factors increasing 
the chance of having paid claims. The reason for this association is that if patients are 
relatively healthy, they are more eager to fight for their right. Patients with less serious 
condition also permit the family more time to request for compensation because they do 
not need to spend more time and cost to care for the patient. However, more serious 
medical injury (moderate to major medical injury) and worse clinical outcome 
(permanent to severe disability) are both associated with the increased compensated 
payment. Aside from the Sloan and Hsieh's study, the long-term follow-up study of 
lawsuits in Harvard study also confirms our latter finding of permanent disability 
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resulting in more payment.s. 
Characteristics of physicians: Department of internal medicine and urology are two 
specialties decreasing the chance of having paid claims. Internal medicine in our hospital 
is the largest department with better accessing abundant resources such as ICU care and 
inter-disciplinary consultation, which may further lower down their risk. Department of 
urology is famous for the chief of department being more active in promoting patient 
safety movement than any other departments. The other two departments-
Otolaryngology as well as Obstetricians and Gynecology, are noted for involving 
high-profile cases, which raise the compensated payment significantly. Otolaryngologists 
in our hospital perform many complicated procedures involving airway, which often 
further result in disastrous outcomes within minutes right after surgical procedure. At 
both ends of physician's age, our results show that younger physicians have lower risk of 
payout, while older physicians have significantly reduced amount of payment. This 
finding is compatible with Bishop's research ss that physicians at the two extremes of age 
have a trend to face less paid claims. The results from an ophthalmological study show 
physicians with more than one claim are more likely to have paid claims than those with 
only one claim or none14, which is contradictory to our findings of decreasing the chance 
of having payments. More studies are needed to make it clear if this factor may be related 
to the special practice style of ophthalmologist or other confounding factors in our study. 
Patient demographics: According to our model, older patients are more likely to have 
paid claims, which is different from Bishop's finding of both younger and lower patients 
have lower chance of having paid claims50. According to a qualitative study39 of 
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analyzing the statements from patients, Chiu describes the cultural values of respecting 
the elderly in traditional Taiwanese ethics tend to cause people to argue for their parents 
or older relatives and therefore, more paid claims will be raised for older patients. About 
the relationship between income and malpractice claims, patients living in high income 
area are less likely to reach a settlement in our study. In contrast to our results, Harvard 
malpractice study shows that because patients of high income can tolerate the initial loss 
of hiring an attorney, they are more likely to file lawsuits36. Sloan's study has a predictor 
for patients in high income level to be modeled at the paid claims, but it turned out to be 
insignificant 43 . The study results of income and compensation still remain controversial, 
and more research is expected to clarify their associations. 
Patient safety classification: Apart from P-SAC6 (patients are emotionally dissatisfied 
with medical service) as a risk-reducing factor, all the other significant patient safety 
classifications are all risk-enhancing factors to increase the probability or the amount of 
paid claims. Initially, it may sound unreasonable that patient's dissatisfaction decrease the 
risk of requesting for payment. But claims assigned in this patient safety category 
actually denote that physicians perform the medical practice encountered in the incident 
without real medical errors. These claims was raised mainly because patient's 
impractically high expectation or emotionally irritation. Since there are no errors or true 
medical injury involved in such claims, the risk-reducing category P-SAC6 of 
emotionally dissatisfaction becomes more straightforward. Just like the variable of 
liability in Sloan's study or the negligent adverse events in Harvard malpractice study, 
these factors are assigned by experts to flag a certain degree of medical errors, which we 
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hope to improve our medical care in the future. In this case, there is no wonder that more 
negative factors are selected in patient safety classification. 
Policy implications: Our study results of risk management factors agree with 
current trends of early risk management intervention in medical malpractice literature67. 
As we mentioned in the discussion session before, if we can prompt these communication 
meetings earlier enough to even before the incident, in our study, this is the most 
significant factor to decrease the risk of paid claims and to reduce the amount of payment. 
Since the official letters for explanation contribute to lessening the risk of having 
compensation, we should employ this method of communication more actively. Since all 
the risk management process focus on communication the most, we propose to promote 
more postgraduate medical educational activities should include more of communication 
skill trainings for physicians to decrease the risk of paid claims. Patient safety 
classification involving practice environment Issues, such as P-SAC7 (Unsafe 
environment without improvement) and P-SAC9 (Uncontrollable environment) provides 
opportunities to bring quality improvement activities into assisting to reduce the risk of 
malpractice payment. If we can work on these claims to remove all the environmental 
factors related to these paid claims, we can save a lot of future compensation. Since 
physicians who do not follow clinical guidelines are also related to higher risk of paid 
claims, post-graduate medical education in promoting clinical guideline and standard 
should also decrease the danger of having payment. As for risk managers like our 
malpractice working group, patients with normal or mildly illness and minor medical 
injury, patients of age group over 50 years old can indicate a red flag or warning sign for 
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increasing the chance of paying out compensation. Therefore, they should be more 
careful of managing these claims. 
Limitations: in addition to the limitations mentioned in the first paper as selection 
bias in our data collection, bias of subjective assessment, small sample size and single 
institutional data source, our study appears to have other weaknesses such as our payment 
for malpractice compensation not including other types of costs such as litigation cost, 
economic loss and other indirect costs 40· Another important factor not included in our 
study is the duration of claims being managed, which was reported to have influence on 
the payment with higher payment being associated with longer management period7. 
Since our study is conducted by constructing risk adjustment models, which indicate that 
most of our results are all based on associations, not a true causal-effect relationship like 
an experimental study, there is a possibility that there might be some instrumental 
variables driving all the associations in our conceptual framework. We will need more 
data and more studies to possibly find out these hidden instrumental variables. 
Future research: after we have completed the two-part model of predicting 
malpractice paid claims, we hope that we can follow a much longer period of time, say 
10-15 years, to look at the compensation for lawsuits in our database. Only then can we 
have enough power to more completely study estimating the compensation for these 
malpractice claims. Another qualitative study in the future to investigate the major 
determinants in our detailed recording of negotiation process will also help us to 
understand the key issues concerns by the patient and physicians and may further assist 
us to reach a settlement earlier. 
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Chapter 3: Forecasting nationwide malpractice cost in Taiwan 
Background 
The financial costs of medical malpractice have always raised public concerns as 
they make headlines all over the world 51. 57· In the United States, after enacting the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010, reducing the rapid growth of health 
expenditure through medical liability reforms continues to attract considerable attention 
among health researchers and policy makers. To get a clear start on the aggregate work 
needed to understand the big picture of this problem, scholars 52, 53 have made efforts to 
estimate national costs of medical malpractice payments as well as for the whole medical 
liability system. Previous studies 54, 55 in the United Kingdom also have focused on 
compiling available statistics in order to project the cost of medical negligence in the 
National Health System (NHS), which indeed proved to be affordable to maintain a 
centralized agency (National Health System Litigation Agency, NHSLA) 49 to handle all 
the malpractice claims against health care system. 
Historically, there has been no malpractice insurance coverage for physicians in 
Taiwan. From the time western medicine was first introduced to Taiwan by Japan in 1895, 
and until recently, the major challenge was to provide enough physicians to meet the 
demand for medical care on this island. The system did not choose to expend time or 
resources to give any attention to malpractice claims. Since 1995, the Government in 
Taiwan started the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP) 58 to provide universal 
coverage for medical access but did not take the malpractice insurance coverage into 
consideration because of budget shortages and hasty implementation choices 58, 59 . Since 
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the NHIP took effect, more people access medical service more easily, and malpractice 
cases with patients suffered from medical injury have begun to draw attention from the 
public 60 . Without malpractice insurance coverage, no matter whether physicians choose 
to go through mediation or go to court to manage their malpractice cases, if judgments 
are ruled against their favor, they need to pay the compensation from their own savings. 
Because the whole mediation or litigation process is not only time-consuming but also 
carries a huge financial risk for physicians, the Government 56 is being pressured to 
propose a malpractice reform of compensation system for better managing these 
malpractice claims 57. To explore the feasibility of implementing this policy, we should 
try our best to project potential nationwide malpractice cost to form a firm base for 
further policy debate. 
To the best of our knowledge, since there has been no organized insurance system, 
no one has made any continuing efforts to collect full information about the current 
medical malpractice situation in Taiwan. Following visionary leadership at one academic 
medical center more than a decade ago, a risk management process has been set up and 
started to actively collect all malpractice records to build up a comprehensive data source 
for National Taiwan University Hospital (NTUH). After establishing a claim database for 
• more than 6 years, we have the chance to employ the amounts of these compensated 
claims to forecast nationwide malpractice cost. Therefore, our objective is to estimate 
nationwide malpractice costs for Taiwan based on our database, given limitations of 
extrapolating from a single hospital. We hypothesize that we are able to predict trends in 
the incidence and cost of malpractice claims in Taiwan and complete the estimation with 
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best available statistics after some fme adjustments. 
Literature review 
After nearly twenty years of rapid economic growth since the 1970's, Taiwan 
implemented universal health insurance program (NHIP) in 1995 and increased the 
coverage from 57% to 98% of the population ss, 76· Often praised as a low cost (less than 
7% of GDP in health care expenditure), efficient health insurance system by US scholar73 
and major media such as NPR news74, and the New York Times75, Taiwan's system 
provides an example for universal coverage and good quality of health care77 while still 
controlling costs very well. Patients remain free to choose any doctor or hospital they 
want to see with small amount of copayment (less than 15 US dollars for an outpatient 
visit), while the system covers almost everything in medical care, including outpatient 
and emergency care, surgical procedures as well as psychiatric, dental, ophthalmological 
services and even traditional medical therapies such as acupuncture and heat massage. 
Despite all the achievements in providing better care, Taiwan's system has its own 
weakness75 : fee-for-service payment encouraging doctors to provide more treatments, no 
systematic way for monitoring and improving quality of care and no automatic increment 
of premium when running out of financial reserves. As a result76, the insurance program 
is bearing huge debt burden now after the system went on for more than 10 years without 
any significant raise of premium rate. Such poor fmancial status of NHIP pushes the 
system to adopt extreme measures to control cost, which further heavily discounts the 
payment to providers, distorts the specialty choices of medical trainees and jeopardizes 
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the long-run financial sustainability. These poorly paid specialties (including internal 
medicine, surgery, obstetrics and gynecology, and emergency medicine) under NHIP are 
also the highest risk group of specialties in malpractice, which additionally increases the 
gap between physician workforce supply and health care demand in Taiwan. 
Traditionally, if patients seek to resolve medical malpractice claims in Taiwan, they 
can either settle with the hospital and physicians, assisted by Department of Health or go 
through legal system to file lawsuits. For those who choose to settle first, they can 
negotiate with the providers in the authorized arbitration committee in Department of 
Health or privately3g. There is no obligation to force both parties to settle the claim in an 
authorized or private institutio1147• Therefore, there is no objective data such as number of 
claims or payment for compensation collected or released in Taiwan. The only survey 
results available right now, conducted by Wu et al. 15 in 2005 showed that 34.9% of claims 
were settled without going to court while 23.1% of claims filed for litigation. 
Just like most countries in Europe continent such as Italy78 , German or Asian 
countries China79 or Japan80, the legal system in Taiwan is civil law which is different 
from common law legal system, used in the United Kingdom and the United States. For 
medical malpractice lawsuits, physicians in Taiwan are both liable to prosecution for 
criminal charge and civil action for compensation. To avoid the burden of proof and the 
prosecution fee, claimants often (64/78=82% of physicians encountering criminal 
litigation in a survey in 2005, according to Wu et al. 15) try to raise a legal claim through 
criminal prosecution as well as civil compensation56. Research63 showed more than 200 
doctors (615 prosecutions in 3 years= 205 prosecutions per year) are criminally charged 
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from 2002 to 2005 and 16 out of them are judged to be guilty, who are fortunately enough 
to be all granted probation or conversion into fine without going to jail. On the other hand, 
because civil cases are subjected to the same standard of judgment as criminal cases in 
Taiwan's court system, patients have less chance to win the civil case in court, which 
results in a low compensation rate for malpractice plaintiffs. The fmding in Chen et al.47 
showed only 17% (67/404 within 9 years) of civil cases are awarded damage payment by 
judges, in comparison to 21 % of claims resolved by trial verdict for plaintiffs in the US6. 
Because of the rapid increase of malpractice cost, many researchers have attempted 
to forecast the cost and incidence of malpractice claims. Among them, Fenn et al.51 ,54,55 
have published several articles of estimating "the cost of hospital negligence claims borne 
by NHS" in England. The researchers tried to use direct extrapolation from a sample of 
data from NHS Management Executive performance indicator in 1990-1 to estimate the 
incidence of settled, outstanding and new claims based on size of population, numbers of 
senior doctors and admissions. Then they multiplied the totals of three types of claims by 
mean settlement cost per claim plus 20% administrative costs to estimate the total cost of 
negligence claim to the NHS. Later on in 2000, this group of scholars explored another 
methodology of combining extrapolation and actuarial data projection method to forecast 
the claims and costs based on the longitudinal malpractice database (established in early 
1980's) from Oxfordshire Health Authority. By estimating the trend of claims and 
"settlement hazard" according to the long term historical figures, they were able to 
predict the volume of open, closed claims and the proportion of settled claims in next 
several years 65 ,66 . By combining several key factors such as paid claim ratio, combined 
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incidence rate of paid claim (per 1000 consultant episodes: the unit of service amount in 
UK), and mean payment per paid claim, they extrapolated "the expected NHS cost of 
clinical negligence per fmished consultant episode", which is the baseline "price" of 
clinical negligence for each kind of services. After given the number of total service 
amount (such as finished consultant episode in UK) as the "quantity" for calculating 
malpractice cost, they can estimate the total cost of negligence to the NHS in England. 
Regarding the growing concerns about medical liability reform and universal 
coverage for health insurance in the US, similar efforts have also been made in recent 
years . One of the newer estimations has been done in 2010 by Mello et al. 52, which 
identified the various components of malpractice cost including indemnity payments, 
administrative expenses, defensive medicine costs and other costs. The researchers 
generated national estimates in each component with best available evidence and 
summed up all the figures of these components to estimate the "overall annual medical 
liability system costs" as $55.6 billion US dollars, or 2.4% of total health care spending 
in 2008. 
Many articles have addressed the no-fault system of compensating patients of 
malpractice claims in New Zealand 10, 61 and Sweden 6Z· To compare malpractice cost 
across countries, Studdert et al. 81,82 and Fenn et al.6s,66 have conducted several studies on 
comparing the no-fault schemes in New Zealand or Sweden to the tort-based malpractice 
systems in the US and England. In summary, the results of comparison 65 showed that, 
after having standardized for population, the no-fault schemes received two to four times 
more claims than the tort systems in Utah and England and paid three to five times more 
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frequently. However, the average payment is much lower in the no-fault schemes, which 
actually decrease the overall payments in these countries, after adjusted by population 
(Some detailed information of this international comparison can be referred to Table 
3-IV). 
Methods and data 
Data Source: For the past decade, we have collected detailed records of malpractice 
claims from both clinical and administrative sources in a tertiary medical center in central 
Taipei City, the largest metropolitan canter with a population of 2.6 million, which is 
located in the north part of the island with a total population of 23 million. Because the 
hospital provides health care in an urban area, the population density is extremely high 
(9,753 people per square kilometer), as compared to the average population density at 
641 people per square kilometers in Taiwan. Since the NHIP in Taiwan permits patients 
to access any hospital they want, no strict service area for this hospital can be defined 
clearly. Therefore, we take the proportion of the annual admission number of NTUH in 
the NHIP as a rough estimate for the proportion of the population the hospital serves 
(650,000=90,000 /3,176,625*23,000,000). The percentage of elderly aged people (> 65 
years old; 10% versus 15%) and the annual admission number (138.46 versus 132.1 per 
thousand population) are relative similar, while the standardized mortality rate (338.8 per 
100,000 people) is lower than the same rate (455.6 per 100,000 people) in Taiwan. The 
reason why the percentage of income support is slightly higher in the NTUH area (1.22%) 
than the rest (0.91 %) is because the threshold for income support varies in different 
places and Taipei city has set a lower level for supporting the poor because of their better 
103 
financial status. In conclusion, patients served by this University hospital are relatively 
healthy with slightly more utilization of health care resources but demographically are 
fairly representative. To highlight the representativeness of the study hospital, we 
compare the associated service amounts and demographics from it to general population 
figures for Taiwan in Table 3-1. We also tabulate the similar comparison between the 
Oxfordshire Health Authority and England from Fen et al.55 in Table 3-1. 
Table 3-I Demographic statistics: Comparison between the hospital service area and 
the general population figures in Taiwan, in contrast to the data in England 
Demographics Oxfordshire# England# NTUH Taiwan 
Total population of service area 
(year) 
610,000 50,000,000 650,000 23,000,000 
Population density of service 
area(/krn2) 
Old age percentage to all people 
Standardized mortality ratio (per 
100,000) 
Annual rate of admission to 
hospital (per 1 000) 
Percentage of the population on 
income support 
(1998) 
234 
16% 
880 
160 
5% 
(1998) (2010) 
378 9,753 
18% 10% 
980 338.8 
172 138.46* 
9% 1.22% 
Closed /Open claims (period) 1993/902 403/42 
(1980- 99) (2005- 10) 
Total Claims/ year -150 - 75 
(2010) 
641 
10.5% 
455.6 
132.1 * 
0.91% 
*Most statistics comes from public information from the Government in 2010, except the 
annual rate of admission to hospital extracted by 2009 due to lack of data in 2010. 
#The statistics of Oxfordshire and England is retrieved from Fenn, et al 55 to contrast the 
differences between two areas. The annual claim incidence of NTUH ( 445/6= 74.2) in 
2010 is about half the size (74.2/152.4= 48 .7%) of Oxfordshire (2895119= 152.4) in 
1998. 
NTUH is a major teaching hospital with 500 staff physicians and about the same 
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number of residents under training. The work force of the hospital consists of 5,500 full 
time employees in total, and nearly half of them are registered nurses (45.5%= 2,500 
/5,500). The hospital capacity consists of 2,500 beds (including psychiatric, oncology and 
rehabilitation facilities) with the annual number of hospital admission around 
80,000~ 100,000 patients, 1,000,000 annual visits of outpatient clinics, 100,000 visits in 
emergency room and 40,000 inpatient surgical procedures per year. Based on the data 
provided in the hospital, the malpractice database was established in the late 1990's. To 
avoid the missing claims in the early period, we decided to analyze the data of recent 6 
years (2005-2010) with a total of 445 claims included in June 2012. 
Methods: Following the descriptions of the trends in incidence of claims and costs, 
we will use various approaches to break down the costs into different components to 
facilitate estimating the possible cost of malpractice in Taiwan, based on the national 
figures provided by the NHIP. Several statistical techniques used in financial science are 
applied in our analysis. First of all, because our data is limited to only 6-year period, it is 
impossible to apply the actuarial methodology similar to Fenn et al. 66 to project the trends 
of close, open and paid claims which spread out along nearly 20 years in time line. 
Instead, we apply the method of simple forward moving average (SFMA) 83 , which is the 
unweighted mean of the previous n datum points (in our case n=2), to forecast the trends 
of our claims, paid claims and paid claim ratios. An example of a simple unweighted 
running mean for n-year sample of closed claims is the mean of previous n years ' number 
of claims. If the numbers of claims are assumed to be C m, C m-1 , . . . , C m-(n-1 ) , then the 
formula is 
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SFMA= C m+ C m-1 + . .. .. +C m-(n-1 )/n 
When calculating next values, a new value comes into the sum and an old value drops out, 
the average of the subset values is "shifting forward" 
SFMA this year= SFMA last year- C m-n/n + Cm/n 
Such manipulation of data can smooth out short-term fluctuations among our data points 
and filter out the noises, which help highlight the trends of our claims 84 . In our case, at 
the expense of one data point, we can observe a fairly clear trend of linearity in the rest of 
five moving average values. 
Secondly, we use least squares linear regression to calculate the trend lines of our 
data in time series, both on the original data series and forward moving average. To fit a 
typical straight trend line to our data is very simple to examine the specific changes at a 
point of time85 . We can use the significance of the time variable as the test for linearity 
and the R-square of the trend line as the proportion of data variations explained by time 
variables. All the statistical calculations are performed by Excel2007. 
In estimating nationwide malpractice, we apply two different approaches inspired by 
Fenn et.al. 54,55 : direct extrapolation from the average of total claims and proportional 
projection from mean payment of paid claims. The first approach of direct extrapolation 
takes all claims into consideration and just divides all payments by the number of total 
claims. After we calculate average payment for compensation per claim, we can simply 
multiply this average payment value by national service amounts of size of population, 
numbers of doctors, annual admissions, and the number of hospital bed to forecast the 
nationwide malpractice costs. 
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The second approach of proportional projection from mean payment of paid claims 
is derived from the financial routines of cost allocation. This approach dissects out paid 
claims away from claims without payment to calculate the first key factor in this method: 
ratio of paid claims. Then we can generate the combined incidence rate of paid claims by 
multiplying ratio of paid claims and annual incidence rate of malpractice claims. After we 
obtain the combined incidence rate of paid claims, we are able to bring another key factor 
in this analysis: total negligence cost per service amount (admission or visit) by 
multiplying mean payment of paid claims from our study sample and combined incidence 
rate of paid claims. This total negligence cost per service amount can be viewed as a 
"price" tag attached to each admission or visit to cover the future expenses resulted from 
malpractice compensation. AT the last step of analysis, we draw on the results of total 
negligence cost per service and multiply it by national service amount such as nationwide 
annual admissions or outpatient visits to estimate the malpractice cost in each sector or 
specialty of clinical service. The detailed computation can be referred to Table 3-III, 
Table 3-IV and Appendix I. 
Results & Discussions 
Our study sample of 445 claims is extracted from the database between January 
2005 and December 2010, which consists of 94 paid claims (all through settlement and 
closed) and 42 lawsuits (all still open claims). The rest of claims are either that patients 
have dropped the case or patients have not contacted this hospital or physicians after two 
years of incident, which is the deadline to file a civil action for medical malpractice 
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injury in Taiwan. In both situations, we will close the claims. 
Trends of claims, paid claims and their incidence rates: To examine the plot of the 
annual number of total claims in each year, there seems to be a linear trend of gradual 
increase from 63 claims to 87 claims (Figure 3-1 ). We further calculate the forward 
moving average of these annual claims to find the series start at 68.5 claims per year to 
83 claims with an increase of nearly 4.5 claims each year (Test for linearity: p=0.0372, 
R-square 0.8106). The annual number of paid claims has a similar tendency of increasing 
by 3.3 claims per year by using the same method (Test for linearity: p=0.0353, R-square 
0.8170). 
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Figure 3-1 Plots of annual new claims and paid claims with forward moving average 
The plots of annual increase of paid claim ratio (Figure 3-2), ranged from 0.13 to 
0.28, also appear to have a linear trend of increasing by 0.023 per year (p=0.0951, 
R-square= 0.5423), with a better fit of linear relationship after adjusted by forward 
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movmg average. 
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Figure 3-2 Plots of annual increase of paid claim ratios 
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Generally, hospital services such as annual admissions tend to increase each year. 
Because the annual growth of claims could partly be attributed to the natural increase of 
services, we need to adjust that confounding effect of increased services by calculating 
annual incidence rate of malpractice claims and paid claims. To calculate the incidence 
rate, we divide the numbers of annual total claims and paid claims by the numbers of 
annual admissions to remove the annual increasing effect in service amounts . After such 
adjusted comparison, we can still observe the tendency of growing incidence in both total 
claims and paid claims, although only the test for linear trend of paid claims is significant 
(p=0 .0327, R-square= 0.8256). 
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Figure 3-3 Increase tendency of total claims and paid claims, adjusted by annual 
admissions ofhospital 
Annual change of cost: Because the annual costs are seriously influenced by the 
maximal values of payments of paid claims in each year, it is difficult to observe the 
trend in these 6 years, even after taking forward moving average (Figure 3-4). The plots 
of average and median amounts in paid claims also have resulted in fluctuated paths. The 
forward moving average of mean payments for compensation even shows a tendency to 
be decreasing (Figure 3-5). 
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Figure 3-4 Change of annual payments for total claims 
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Figure 3-5 Change of annual average payments and median payments for each paid 
claims 
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National estimates for settlement: If we consider all the trends mentioned above and 
assume that NTUH represents the national picture of NHIP in Taiwan, it becomes 
possible that we can project the malpractice costs from this data. Our first approach is to 
calculate the incidence of total claims divided by various population indexes and service 
indexes to estimate the national figures of annual total claims and total costs by 
multiplying their corresponding overall service amounts in Taiwan. 
Take an example of using the number of doctors as an index to forecast the national 
estimates. We have about 1000 doctors (including residents) working in the hospital, with 
annual new claims of 74.2 claims per year, the baseline rate of new claims is 7.42 claims 
per 100 doctors, which is a little lower than 10.5 per 100 doctors in England and 13 per 
100 doctors in the United States in 199454. To compare to another study of lawsuits in 
Taiwan 47, they found emergency physicians had the highest risk with suits per 100 
doctors at 10.7, followed by neurosurgeon at 6.5 per 100 doctors. But lawsuits generally 
are less frequent than settlement by one-third to one-fifth 40, our estimate seems to be 
reasonably fall in the middle of these specialties. 
After we obtain the incidence of annual claims per 100 doctors, we can multiply it 
by total number of physicians (38,000) to get the nationwide estimate of annual new 
claims (7.42*38,000= 2624.5). Then we employ the average payment per claim 
(83 ,378.1=37,103,243/445 in NTD, exchange rate to US dollar: 30/1) to multiply the 
annual nationwide new claims (83,378.1 *2624 . 5~ 235 million NTD, 7.83 million USD). 
The other estimates can all be referred to Table 3-11. From that table, we find the highest 
value comes from the estimate using total bed as an index (~ 362 million NTD, 12.1 
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million USD), while the lowest is about 126 million NTD (USD 4.2 million). It is most 
likely that the case mix index in NTUH is the highest in Taiwan, which result in more 
chance of causing malpractice claims. We will discuss this information further later in the 
international comparison session. 
Table 3-II Estimations of national malpractice cost based on size of population, numbers 
of doctors, annual admissions and number of hospital bed 
NTUH annual new claims: 74.17 (445/6) ~er l:ear 
Capacity Unit Average National Nationwide Nationwide 
index number of Figures estimate of estimate of 
claims claims cost 
Size of 650,000 11.411100,000 23,000,000 2624.5 ~219 million 
population people (218,825,823) 
Number of 1,000 7.42/100 Dr. 38,000 2817.7 ~235 million 
doctors (234,934,472) 
Annual 90,000 8.24/10000 3,176,625 2617.5 ~218 million 
admission admission (218,245,167) 
number 
Annual 100,000 7.42/10000 2,081 ,262 1544.3 ~ 126 million 
admission admission (125,856,990) 
number 
Number of 2,500 29.67/1000 146,187 4337 ~362 million 
hospital bed bed (361 ,61 0,820) 
The second approach is using paid claim ratio as a pivotal point to divide the 
calculation into two parts: the first part computes the frequency of paid claims, while the 
second part calculates the average amount per paid claims. This method is much more 
useful especially when we want to break down the projection into several categories. In 
our study sample, the paid claims ratio for overall data is 21.12% (94/445) and the 
average compensated payments per paid claim is NTD 394,715 (37,103,243/ 94; USD 
13,157.2). The detailed steps of calculation are listed in Appendix I. Table 3-III reports 
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the estimates m the first column usmg only annual admission number and in the 
following three columns are broken into three parts: inpatient, outpatient clinics (OPD) 
and emergency room (ER). The last column considers the fact that most general 
physicians carry a much lower malpractice risk making them unsuitable for inclusion in 
the risk pool for estimation. Table 3-N breaks the inpatient part further into six common 
clinical specialties: internal medicine, surgery, pediatrics, obstetrics and gynecology, 
orthopedics and other. 
To compare the national estimates from different breakdowns, we can find the 
annual incidence rate of malpractice claims per 10,000 service amounts (admissions or 
visits), which means the standardized incidence rate compared across different locations, 
changes dramatically from inpatient (4.25 claims per 10,000 admissions) down to less 
than one-third in emergency room (1.25 claims per 10,000 ER visits) and finally to only 
4.2% of incidence rate in inpatient department for outpatient clinics (0.18 claims per 
I 0,000 outpatient visits). This is related to their intensity of clinical activity and therefore, 
bears the relative amounts of malpractice burden. The second crucial rate is the combined 
incidence rate of paid claims, which is equal to annual incidence rate of malpractice 
claims multiplied by ratio of paid claims. With an even lower ratio of paid claims (0.15), 
the combined rate in ER drops to 0.18, only 18.2% of the combined rate in inpatient 
wards (0.99). The combined rate of paid claims in Oxfordshire in 1998 is 0.29 per 1000 
finished consultation episode, which is equivalent to 2.9 per 10,000 service amounts in 
the unit of our study, a little higher than the paid claims rate in NTUH. This may be in 
part due to the lower ratio of paid claims in Taiwan than in Oxfordshire (0.21 versus 
114 
30~40%) and in part more legal activities against NHS (about 75 new claims in NTUH 
per year versus 150 claims per year in Oxfordshire) in a region of similar population and 
annual admission number. 
The third critical number in this table is total negligence cost per service, which 
integrates the average payment per paid claim and the combined incidence rate of paid 
claims. This number accounts for the economic burden of malpractice cost in each 
service unit. It can be viewed as the "malpractice price" for different clinical situations. 
After multiply it by national service amounts, we can reach the number of our national 
cost of negligence in that specific clinical situation. As compared to the expected cost of 
clinical negligence per finished consultation episode at about 300 NTD (5.24 pounds, 
adjusted for CPI in 2010 NTD= 5.24*110/90*46.58= 298.3) in England in 1998, our total 
negligence cost per service is around NTD 60 for using estimates in inpatient data only. 
Using this total negligence cost per service to compare across three parts of this hospital, 
we can find the inpatient part is loaded with a much larger economic burden in each 
admission (NTD 55.3), as compare to only NTD 3.03 for each ER visits and NTD 0.23 
per OPD visit. The national estimate for malpractice by admission only is about 126 
million NTD (USD 4.2 million). It increases to 200 million NTD (6.7 million USD) by 
breaking down the cost into three parts. In the last column of Table 3-III, we also 
calculate an alternative projection (about NTD 158 million) in a condition of throwing 
away general physicians' costs because their lower risk of malpractice and should not be 
included together for calculation. 
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Table 3-Ill National estimates for malpractice cost: broken down into three parts 
Estimated by Inpatient Emergency Outpatient Outpatient 
admission room clinics clinics without 
only general 
_physicians 
Annual new claims 74.17 43.50 12.50 18.17 18.17 
Annual service amount 102,261 102,261 100,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 
Annual incidence rate of 
claims per 10,000 7.25 4.25 1.25 0.18 0.18 
admissions or visits 
Ratio of paid claims 0.21 0.23 0.15 0.20 0.20 
Combined incidence rate 
of paid claims per 1.53 0.99 0.18 0.04 0.04 10,000 admissions or 
visits 
Total negligence cost per 60.47 55.30 3.03 0.23 0.23 
service 
National service amount 2,081 ,262 2,081,262 6,478,162 282,996,992 101,347,914 
Overall national cost of 125,856,990 115,094,508 19,658,080 63,774,410 22,839,124 
negligence 
Summation of three parts I 198,526,997 157,591,712 
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If we examine the results of malpractice cost being broken down into 8 parts (Table 
3-IV), the estimated national malpractice cost is 196 million NTD, not far away from the 
three-part estimation. But the comparison of these rates between different specialties 
reveals that surgery and orthopedics have the highest incidence rate of about 6~ 7 claims 
per 10,000 admissions, while pediatrics has only 1.6 claims per 10,000 admissions. 
Because of some high-profile cases, obstetrics and gynecology have the highest ratio of 
paid claims (0.47) and the largest negligence cost per admission (NTD 153 per 
admission). The other specialties consist of departments such as dentistry, otolaryngology 
and radiology, which all have one or two huge compensated payments to drive up their 
average negligence cost per admission (NTD 115 per admission). The negligence costs 
per service of surgery and orthopedics are about the same, at the rate of NTD 40 per 
admission. Obstetrics and gynecology and the other specialties have larger amounts of 
compensation estimates (NTD 44 million and 34 million) than other specialties, which 
are mostly caused by much higher total negligence cost per admission ( NTD 153.04 and 
115.39 as compared to the average value at NTD 60). Because this hospital is a tertiary 
refer centers, the cases managed here are more complicated than other hospitals. This 
may work in a way towards increasing the estimates. On the other hand, the tum-over 
rate of the hospital bed in NTUH is higher than other hospitals, which will lower down 
the estimates by calculation based on admission number. 
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Table 3-IV Nationwide estimate for malpractice cost: broken into eight parts (Inpatient ward broken into 6 parts as below) 
Internal Surgery Pediatrics Obstetrics and Orthopedics Others Medicine Gynecology 
Annual new claims 13.33 14.33 1.83 2.83 3.67 7.50 
Annual admission number 31,542 21,340 11,297 7,877 6,007 24,198 
Market share in NHIP 5.23% 5.34% 4.52% 3.56% 2.63% 6.39% 
Annual incidence rate of malpractice claims 4.23 6.72 1.62 3.60 6.10 3.10 per 10,000 admissions 
Ratio of paid claims 0.11 0.23 0.09 0.47 0.32 0.36 
Combined incidence rate of paid claims per 0.48 1.56 0.15 1.69 1.94 1.10 10,000 admissions 
Total negligence cost per admission 15.96 42.10 1.77 153.04 39.20 115.39 
National number of annual admission 603,505 399,509 249,927 221,235 228,642 378,444 
........ Overall national cost of negligence 9,634,402 16,819,085 443,296 33,857,151 8,963,259 43,667,461 
........ 
J196,817,144 00 Summation of all eight parts 
National estimates for lawsuits: Our previous computation does not include the 
malpractice costs for lawsuit. Despite being open claims in the database, we can still 
possibly estimate the additional cost for malpractice coverage from lawsuits by applying 
some statistics retrieved from literature. Chen et al. 47 have collected all lawsuits against 
physicians in Taiwan from 2000 to 2008 from open database in Taiwan court system. 
Among 404 cases analyzed, only 67 claims were granted awards (ratio of paid claims: 
17%). The average payment ranged from 5.4 million NTD (USD 184,504) in emergency 
medicine to 300,005 NTD (USD 10,345) in plastic surgery. We recalculate the average 
payments of paid claims aggregated from each specialty to estimate an overall average 
payment to be around 3.75 million NTD (USD 129,276). Based on their results, annual 
lawsuits with compensation are estimated to have 7.4 paid claims (67/9 = 7.44) while 
those cases under the litigation of civil action are calculated to be 44.9 annual lawsuits 
(404/9 = 44.89) each year. Therefore, the total compensation can be estimated to be 27.75 
million NTD (7.4* 3.75 million, USD 925,000). According to the statistics from 
Department of Health 63 , in average, about 36.7 Taiwan doctors are subjected to criminal 
prosecution every year. Because there might be some overlapping between cases of 
criminal charge and civil action, our estimate for legal costs by simply adding both 
criminal charges and civil actions together may towards to the bias of increasing estimate. 
Defense costs in Taiwan for each malpractice case range from NTD 50,000 to 
100,000 (mean: 75,000) for each stage of litigation. For those prosecuted claims or civil 
lawsuits, it may take two to three stages of trials to reach the fmal ruling. If we consider 
that all prosecuted cases go through three stages (which is in fact more frequently than 
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only closed at first or second stage), then the defense cost for those prosecuted claims can 
be calculated as NTD 8.26 million (36.7*3*75000= 8,257,000). The defense costs of civil 
cases can be estimated to be 6.74 million, similar to prosecuted cases: (44.9 claims * 2 
stages of litigation* 75 ,000 legal costs = 6,735 ,000) As a result, the estimate for 
nationwide annual malpractice cost for lawsuits is NTD 42.7 million (1.42 million USD) 
(Table 3-V). 
Table 3-V Estimate for nationwide malpractice costs for lawsuits 
Compensation Defense cost Total amounts 
Civil action Prosecution 
Total claims 7.4 44.9 36.7 81.6 
Average payment 3,750,000 2*75,000 3*75,000 
Annual payments 27,750,000 6,735,000 8,257,500 42,742,500 
Combining Table 3-II, 3-III, 3-IV and 3-V, our estimate for nationwide malpractice 
cost in Taiwan is NTD 239.6 million (239,559,644, 7.99 million USD), ranged from NTD 
168.6 million to 404.3 million (5.62 million to 13.4 million USD). 
International comparison: According to previous studies by Fenn et al. 65, 66 , we list 
the results of this study as well as the statistics from several western countries in Table 
3-VI. Because the data of the US state of Utah is from a tort system, the incidence rates 
of annual new claims (16.79 per 100,000 people) and paid claims (10.08 per 100,000 
people) are relatively lower than other western countries, especially New Zealand and 
Sweden, which are under no-fault scheme. Because their systems provide a broader 
coverage (the highest two annual claim incidences per 100,000 people, 87.25, 46.64 per 
100,000 people) with relative lower average payments (around 6000~ 10,000 USD), their 
systems are thought to be able to provide a more equitable compensation but still control 
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the cost. Because of relatively lower ratio of paid claims (21%) as well as annual 
incidence of new claims (11.38 per 100,000 people) and low average payment (13,518 
USD), the overall malpractice costs in Taiwan are the lowest as compared to other 
countries, which indicates that we are still in the early stage of malpractice development 
and may have chance to encounter a rapid growth of claims in the foreseeable future. To 
be compared to England, the ratio of paid claims and adjusted annual new claims in 
Taiwan are both about the half of their values. Therefore, the incidence rate of annual 
paid claims is one-quarter of England and the overall annual payment per 100,000 is only 
4-5% ofEngland's costs. 
Table 3-VI International comparison of malpractice costs 
Utah (tort) New Sweden England Taiwan 
Zealand 
Annual new claims 375 1,743 7,775 10,517 2,617 
Ratio of paid claims 60% 60% 47% 40% 21% 
Annual Eaid claims 225 1045.8 3654.25 4206.8 549.57 
PoEulation 2,233,169 3,737,277 8,910,910 50,225,000 23,000,000 
Annual claims per 16.79 46.64 87.25 20.94 11.38 
100,000 EeoEle 
Annual paid claims 10.08 27.98 41.01 8.38 2.39 
Eer 100,000 EeoEle 
Average payment per 32,677 7,419 63,000 57,447 394,715 
paid claim in local USD NZD SEK GBP NTD 
currency 
Average payment in 32,677 6,096 9,557 92,834 13,518 
USD 
Overall payment per 329,233 170,589 391,924 777,572 32,300 
100,000 people 
Sensitivity analysis: Although our current estimate is carefully deduced, to avoid the 
chance of making mistakes, we change some critical values of our estimation and to see 
how it influences on the results. Among these numbers used for computation, the most 
influential one should be the total malpractice cost per service, which contains two 
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components: the combined rate for paid claims and the average payment per paid claim. 
In Table 3-N, we can find this figure ranging from NTD 153 in obstetrics and 
gynecology to NTD 1.77 in pediatrics. If we take the extreme value of obstetrics and 
gynecology as a base for all inpatient claims, then our estimate for inpatient malpractice 
costs will rise from NTD 115 million up to 318 million (nearly three times as large). That 
change will also cause the total payments to increase to 400 million in NTD. 
Another pair of important factors is the ratio of paid claims and the average 
payments per paid claim. The first one is likely to be increasing along the predictive 
linear trend to 40% (as in a well-developed country such as England) or 60% (as in a 
no-fault scheme), which, holding the rest of factors unchanged, will cause the estimate to 
increase to NTD 400 million or 600 million. The average payment per paid claims in our 
study is around 13,000 USD, which could be pushed up to 90,000 (nearly 7 times) as in 
England, or could be driven down to below 10,000 (about one half to two thirds), as in 
no-fault countries like Sweden and New Zealand. The worst scenario is both of them 
reach their maxima and the estimates will possibly jump up to 21 times and the resulting 
malpractice cost climbs up to around 4.2 billion NTD (140 million USD). That number 
seems to be high enough to cause a financial disaster, but in contrast to the annual budget 
for NHIP in Taiwan (around 500 billion NTD), even this exaggerated estimation of 
malpractice cost only makes up less than 1% of the budget. 
Implementation & Policy related problems: 
We have utilized our dataset from a well-established database in a major urban 
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medical center to forecast the annual malpractice cost for a nationwide compensation 
system in Taiwan. Despite the main features of this hospital being different from other 
institutions in Taiwan, we have estimated the malpractice costs and recognize the linear 
trends of increasing new claims and paid claims ratios after adjusted for this hospital and 
physician capacity using sensitivity analysis and the best evidence available. After using 
the method of forward moving average, we are able to identify the annual growth rate of 
new claims at 6% (4.5174.2= 6.06%), which is comparable to the "7% per annum" during 
the 1990's in Oxfordshire 55 . The increasing rates of the other three indicators are the 
annual increase of paid claims at 21 % (3.3/15.7= 21.03%), adjusted incidence of new 
claims at 4.4% (0.3456/8.00=4.4%) and ratio of paid claims at 11% (0.023/0.21= 
10.95%), which are all meaningful but still controllable. 
In Taiwan, because the legal system is different from a common law system like the 
United States has, another concern is that the prosecutor can file a criminal charge against 
physicians for malpractice lawsuits. Directly revealed from a report of government 56, 
nearly all people who suffered from medical injury prefer to choose this process because 
patients do not have to bear the burden of proof and can avoid the expensive litigation 
cost, since they do not have to pay the lawyers directly. However, even after the 
defendants are accused ofmalpractice, it still is a long-term journey to get into a criminal 
court which has already been packed with a massive caseload from various other crimes. 
A properly reformed malpractice compensation system will award patients directly 
without wasting the time and expense of undergoing those legal procedures. Therefore, 
such reform will benefit the most those who are in an urgent need of financial support 
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after a malpractice incident. 
Except for being more efficient and timely, it also may be more equitable for 
patients to receive a payment for their loss through this nationwide coverage for 
malpractice compensation. Because of the difficulty of proving cause-effect relationships 
in courts, most patients fail to win the cases. The statistics from the Ministry of Justice58 
of Taiwan show that malpractice cases for patient's deceased outcome have stayed at a 
6% average rate of conviction for a decade. Among those accused by a prosecutor, the 
judge will issue a ruling for compensation for only about 10% of them. For patients who 
go through all of the legal processes and finally win the case, the chance of being granted 
compensation is so low (roughly about 0.6%) that only a limited proportion of patients 
reap the rewards at all. It is not fair to have the compensation concentrated in those 
"fortunate" few instead of compensating more of those who actually suffered a loss. 
Despite its inequity of rewards for patients, the relatively low rate of judgment in 
favor of patients keeps the malpractice costs for lawsuits playing a minor role in our 
analysis of Taiwan's compensation estimation. Our estimates for annual nationwide 
malpractice costs for lawsuits, including litigation and compensation, only account for 
17.8 % of our estimated total malpractice costs (42.7 million/239.6 million= 17.8%), 
which is the reason why we choose to spend more time on computing the settled part of 
malpractice compensation. Such a low estimated percentage of Taiwan's malpractice 
costs related to lawsuits may imply that the composition of malpractice costs is different 
from western countries, where generally malpractice lawsuits costs account for around 
20-40 percent of the totaL10. Because it is often more difficult to prove physician guilty in 
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a criminal charge, most physicians are not ruled liable for a payment by judge. As a result, 
injured patients who still suffer from the consequence of medical care they received are 
less likely to have the award they think they deserve through litigation process. The 
frustrated feelings sometimes may have an impact on the society to create an atmosphere 
of suspicion between physicians and patients. The unfulfilled gap of expectation may also 
frequently break the necessary trust inherited in the better doctor-patient relationship, 
which is one of the major reasons why the Government is proposing a reform as an 
attempt to ameliorate this gap. 
Although the proportion of lawsuits in malpractice costs in Taiwan seems to be low, 
we can confirm this figure is in this range using another approach. From Chen's study of 
nine-year cases from the judicial system of Taiwan, we can fmd that the number of total 
paid claims is 67, which results in an annual average of paid claims to be 7.4 paid claims 
per year (67/9). Because the market share ofNTUH in the whole NHIP range from 2.63% 
to 6.39%, assuming the malpractice risk equally distributed and taking the maximal 
values into account, the annual paid claims from lawsuits in this hospital are estimated to 
be 0.47 paid claims per year (7.4*6.39%), which is a little more than our previous 
estimate: 0.07 (0.428/6) paid claims per year, but still accounts for less than 1 lawsuit 
over every two year period. This difference may be caused by far fewer lawsuits in this 
hospital and needs more research to clarify the actual situation across Taiwan. 
According to the literature on no-fault compensation schemes 61 ,62 , it is said to be 
much more efficient to compensate patients for pain and suffering from medical injury 
through a compensation system than through a formal litigation system. To build a social 
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system to handle malpractice claims like this generally requires the builders to consider 
not only the immediacy of financial benefit but also the social trust of continuous 
self-improvement committed by health care providers. Patients who have suffered a 
major loss from medical injury should not have to wait a long time to receive their 
compensation. Studies from New Zealand 6 1 and Sweden 62 showed that patients who 
appealed for national malpractice reimbursement could obtain payment within a shorter 
period of time, from 15 to 41 weeks, than those who went to court (at least two to four 
years). This more-timely manner of compensation system certainly is more beneficial for 
injured patients. 
The reform for malpractice compensation may also reduce the high malpractice risk 
of some physicians by pooling this risk among all physicians. Because of a lack of 
malpractice insurance coverage in Taiwan, physicians in high-risk specialties such as 
surgery, obstetrics, and gynecology have been walking away from their jobs to avoid 
huge financial risk 57 • If we cannot establish a more reasonable malpractice compensation 
system for these high-risk physicians, no doctors are willing to care for these serious 
patients. If we can pool all the risks together and make them more acceptable for 
high-risk specialties, physicians and hospitals may be more willing to share the risks 
equally and will not go bankrupt or even leave the country to get rid of the debt. 
To further control the increase of malpractice costs and lessen the damage on 
medical practice environment, our results and sensitivity analysis clearly demonstrate that 
it is possible to provide adequate malpractice compensation for injured patients; therefore, 
we agree with the Government's current approach of proposing a reform for malpractice 
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compensation. People have always been afraid that the coverage cost will not be 
affordable if all malpractice claims are covered. But the experience in other countries 
such as England and Sweden showed that the expenditure will be lower if we start to set 
up an effective claim-management system earlier. As our results show, in contrast to other 
countries, Taiwan is still in the early stages of malpractice claim development and the 
incidence rate of malpractice claims (adjusted annual claim rate) is still low, about half 
the rate of that in England. Although it will increase gradually, we will regret not having 
taken action now when it grows uncontrollably high in the future. 
Although there are still no clear pictures of how the government in Taiwan will draft 
reforms to the compensation system, some possible directions point to several policies 
similar to the discussion in the United States such as capping the compensation, 
providing immediate payments for injured patients, overcoming the obstacles from 
evidence collection and a fixed award scale for compensation 56, 60 . If the reform works 
well, it is possible to ease the effects of a current lack of physician manpower in some 
high-risk clinical fields. Although the total cost may be somewhat more than the ongoing 
system, it will pay back a lot more if we start to control it from now on. 
Policies concern compensation for malpractice has been debated in drafting the 
proposal. As reported in the news 57, current proposals to cap the compensation at 2 
million NTD (=USD 66,667) per case might be acceptable since projections from our 
database suggest such a cap has effectively covered almost 90 % of all the paid claims 
(89/94= 90.43%). In addition to the amount of payments, the timing of paying is also 
very critical to lessen patients' urgent need for taking care of further medical problems or 
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relieving economic pressures. Most no-fault schemeS6t send out compensation within 
4-10 months, which we think is also suitable for Taiwan's system to work efficiently. 
Additionally, a fixed award scale is pivotal for compensating patients more equitably and 
effectively. Our study (Chapter 2) of the associated determinants in predicting payments 
for malpractice claims is an initial attempt to fulfill the basic requirement for this policy. 
To reduce the frequent threat of being criminally charged for physicians, several 
policies need to be addressed. To decrease the interference of being investigated and the 
risk of being prosecuted faced by medical personnel, the Department of Health of Taiwan 
advocates limiting the criminal liability for serious and lethal medical malpractice, which 
hopefully can save the efforts of prosecutors and the time cost of physicians. Currently, 
there is only one centralized Medical Review Committee of Department of Health (DOH) 
to serve as the final judgment of medical errors within malpractice cases in Taiwan. 
However, the number of cases increased rapidly from about 150 cases in 1987 to over 
550 in 2011 56, which has resulted in serious delay with wait time lengthened for more 
than 2 years. One of the solutions to speed up the process is to decentralize the committee 
by setting up more regional expert panels to shorten the delay of mediation process. 
German model of extra-judicial claims resolutions6, which provides decision on each case 
assessed by one physician and one lawyer from the panel after aided by external expert 
opinions, is reported to be able to finish the final decision within 3 months on average. 
Since settlement can reach a payment much faster than litigation process, the Department 
of Health also suggests to establish a more reliable and efficient mediation process to 
facilitate reconciliation by requiring both sides to start to negotiate earlier (less than 1 
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month after incident) and scheduled payment in time (the limit of time 1s still 
undetermined) from Government Fund for compensation56. 
Limitations: Since our study sample is extracted from a database built in a single 
institution, some difficulties should be discussed here. Our sample size is still limited and 
with an overweight of more serious patients than other hospitals. The observation period 
is only 6 years, too short to examine a long-term trend of bow the number of claims will 
change (although the trend analyses of both seem to be still climbing) or, especially, the 
total malpractice cost will grow or decline. There is also no enough time to follow all the 
lawsuits through their final litigation outcome, which makes our study bard to be 
connected to the legal cost of malpractice litigation. The distribution of the cases in this 
study is also highly concentrated in a region within a radius of about 30 kilometers 
around this hospital, which comprises a group of residents with generally higher irlcome, 
higher level of educational and better access to medical care than those living in other 
places. How these patients with such characteristics behave differently from the others 
needs more research to clarify their impact on national malpractice cost. 
Future research: To overcome all the difficulties we encountered during this study, 
we suggest constructing a central agency, like NHSLA in Britain, which can coordinate 
data sources of all claims and payments connected to medical malpractice and associated 
mediating and litigation processes as well as handle these compensated claims on its own 
merits. It is not until Taiwan does this that we can obtain more accurate information to 
generate more reliable and authentic estimates for the malpractice costs now and in the 
future. Before that, we should encourage more health care leaders and clinical 
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practitioners to participate in collecting more records to build up more databases and 
eventually improving our knowledge of malpractice information. 
We believe a more efficient, equitable and effective reform of current system for 
compensating injured patients is a policy feasible and affordable in Taiwan. Although our 
study has some defects and limitations, it is the first one which has carefully considered 
all the intertwined factors and reliably assessed all the components of the malpractice 
cost structure to the extent possible given these limitations. Before some more 
comprehensible information appears, our estimates should be the most trustworthy 
figures available. We would like to provide our projection as a start to give more attention 
to this important research topic. 
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Appendix 
I: 
A. Estimate by annual admission number: 
1. New claims per year: 74.17 (445/6) 
2. Annual admission number: 100,000 admissions 
3. Annual incidence rate of malpractice claims (Average number of new 
claims per 10,000 admission per year): 7.42/10,000 admissions 
(74.17/100,000*10,000) 
4. Combination incidence rate of paid claims: 1.57/10,000 admission 
( 21.12% * 7.42110000 admissions) 
5. Mean payment per paid claim (NTD): 394,715= 37,103,243/94 
6. Total negligence cost per admission (NTD): 61.84= 394,715 * 1.57/10,000 
7. National number of annual admission: 2,081,262 admissions (Based on 
total admission in 201 0) 
8. Overall national cost of negligence (NTD): ~129 million (128,702,616= 
2,081,262* 1.57/10,000) 
B. Estimate by service amount according to location of incident: 
1. Inpatient admission number: 
a. New claims per year: 43.5 (261/6) 
b. Annual admission number: 102,261 admissions (Based on annual 
admission number in 2010 in NTUH) 
c. Annual incidence rate of malpractice claims (Average number of new 
claims per 10,000 admissions per year): 4.25/10,000 admission 
(43.5/ 102,261 *10,000) 
d. Ratio of paid claims: 23 .37% (611261) 
e. Combined incidence rate of paid claims per 10,000 admissions: 
0.99/10,000 admissions= 23.37% * 4.25/10,000 admissions 
f. Mean payment per paid claim (NTD): 556,236= 33,930,412/ 61 
g. Total negligence cost per admission (NTD): 55.30= 556,236 * 
0.99/10,000 
h. National number of annual admission: 2,081,262 
i. Overall national cost of negligence in inpatient part (NTD): ~ 115 
million (55.30 * 2,081,262=115,094,508) 
2. Emergency Room (ER) visit: 
a. New claims per year: 12.5 (75/6) 
b. Annual ER visits: 100,000 visits 
c. Annual incidence rate (Average number of new claims per 10,000 
visits per year): 1.25/10,000 visits (12.5/100,000) 
d. Ratio of paid claims: 14.67% (11 /64) 
e. Combined incidence rate of paid claims: 0.1834/10,000 visits= 
14.67% * 1.25110,000 visits 
f. Mean payment per paid claim (NTD): 165,519= 1,820,709/ 11 
g. Total negligence cost per ER visit (NTD): 3.035= 165,519 * 
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al.: 
0.1834/ 10,000 
h. N ationa1 number of annual ER visit: 6,4 78,162 visits 
i. Overall national cost of negligence in emergency part (NTD): ~ 19.7 
million (3.036 * 6,478,162= 19,658,080) 
3. Out-patient clinics (OPD) visit: 
a. New claims per year: 18.17 (109/6) 
b. Annual OP visits: 1,000,000 visits 
c. Annual incidence rate (Average number of new claims per 10,000 
visits per year): 0.1817/10,000 visits (18.17/1,000,000) 
d. Ratio of paid claims: 20.18% (2211 09) 
e. Combined incidence rate of paid claims: 0.03667/10,000 visits= 
20.18% * 0.1817/10,000 visits 
f. Mean payment per paid claim (NTD): 61,460= 1,352,122/ 22 
g. Total negligence cost per OPD visit (NTD): 0.2254= 61 ,460 * 
0.03667/10,000 
h. National number of annual OPD visit: 282,996,992 visits 
i. Overall national cost of negligence in outpatient part (NTD): ~64 
million (0.2254 * 282,996,992= 63,774,410) 
4. Taking out OPD visits of General practitioner (GP): (Estimates for hospital 
OPD only) 
a. National number of annual OPD visits: 101,347,914 visits 
b. Overall national cost of negligence in outpatient part (NTD): ~23 
million (0.2254* 101,347 ,914=22,839, 124) 
5. Overall national cost of malpractice claims: 115 million+ 19.7 million+ 64 
million= 199 million 
6. Taking out GP: Overall national cost of malpractice claims: 115 million+ 
19.7 million+ 23 million= 158 million 
II: Calculation of the average payment for paid claims (suits) from Chen et 
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Table A-I List of malpractice risk and cost for medical malpractice in Taiwan (Currency: NTD/USD = 29/1) 
Obstetrics and Orthopedics Plastic Surgery Internal Anesthesiology Neurosurgery 
Gynecology surgery medicine 
Total payments in 32,468,006 13,768,115 899,974 10,051,208 56,175,401 32,278,519 51,985,626 
NTD 
Total payments in 1,119,586 474,763 31,034 346,593 1,937,083 1,113,052 1,792,608 
USD 
Number of suits 13 3 3 9 11 3 11 
Mean payment in NT 2,497,539 4,589,372 299,991 1,116,801 5,106,855 10,759,506 4,725,966 
dollar 
Median payment in NT 2,186,046 2,906,729 300,000 400,000 4,217,076 7,477,096 2,220,678 
dollar 
Mean payment in US 86,122 158,254 10,345 38,511 176,098 371,017 162,964 
dollar 
-
Median payment in US 75,381 100,232 10,345 13,793 145,416 257,831 76,575 
(.;.) 
dollar (.;.) 
Emergency Ophthalmology Dentistry Overall 
medicine 
Total payments in 37,454,214 4,406,327 11 ,695,360 251 ,182,750 
NTD 
Total payments in 1,291,525 151,942 403 ,288 8,661 ,474 
USD 
Number of suits 7 5 2 67 
Mean payment in 5,350,602 881 ,265 5,847,680 3,748,996 
NT dollar 
Median payment in 6,001,585 723,558 5,847,680 2,424,098 
NT dollar 
Mean payment in 184,504 30,388 201,644 129,276 
US dollar 
,........ Median payment in 206,951 24,950 201 ,644 83,590 
w US dollar +:>. 
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